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THE ROLE OF WOMEN I  DISPUTING AMONG THE ILA OF ZAMBIA: 
POLITICAL ADAPTATION I  LEGAL CHANGE 
by Charles R. Cutshall 
This article examines the role of female litigants within the changing 
social context of disputing and dispute processing among the Ila of 
Zambia.l While the historical and contemporary case material upon which 
this article is based ultimately reveals a complexity of substantive and 
procedural points of law across the spectrum of disputing modes and disputing 
forums available to aggrieved Ila females, here I am more concerned with the 
elaboration of social realities in legal process -- the social forces which 
shape legal expectations. Such elaboration, I argue, requires not only an 
examination of law and dispute settlement, but also the political context of 
disputing and dispute processing. This article, therefore, addresses itself 
to rather skeletal theory generated from research conducted under the broad 
heading of "the politics of law. n2 
In the more developed middle-range of political theories of law, the chief 
hypothesis proposes that every dispute which threatens or actually invokes a 
formal third party "is political at least to the extent that it reiterates the 
right to exercise authority and asserts the legitimacy of the political entity 
that allocated the authority" (Moore, 1978:208). Furthermore, where the poli-
tical field of disputing is expanding, as in areas which formerly lacked 
adjudicative authority, the outcomes of disputes and the decisions of remedy 
agents regarding particular issues will be molded to suit the existing 
political context. These propositions are contained within a more "bare-
bones" system of general theory relevant for research in legal change or law 
development. In this, methodological transformations from lower levels of 
abstraction to higher ones are achieved by positing the "semi-autonomous 
social field" (Moore, 1978: 57-59), and then operationalizing the concept in 
research settings. Stated simply, the "semi-autonomous social field" allows 
the investigator to focus upon relations of power, in decision-making and 
self-regulation, among individuals and groups (corporate and noncorporate) as 
they attempt to maintain or change the substance of procedure of law. Using a 
representational sample of synoptic and extended case material, where at least 
one of the aggrieved parties is an Ila female, this article tests the 
hypotheses that (1) every dispute settlement involving an aggrieved Ila female 
is a matter of political decision-making, and that (2) the political component 
of dispute settlement affects the pattern of grievance escalation for Ila 
females, as well as the outcomes of disputes which are actually processed in a 
disputing forum. At the same time, this article examines the viability of the 
"semi-autonomous social field" as a suitable way of defining critical 
components of legal process within a more encompassing framework of theory 
dealing with legal change and law development. 
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Research Setting 
The research site is the Ila-speaking chieftaincy of Mugaila, located in 
the rural Namwala District, 3 Southern Province, Republic of Zambia. 
Mungaila is neither the largest nor the most populated of the ten 
administratively recognized Ila chieftaincies. Yet, owing to its proximity to 
the seasonally rich grazing area of the Kafue floodplain, and the virtual 
absence of tsetse fly, Mungaila is proportionately the wealthiest of the 
traditional cattle-herding areas in th Namwala District. While cattle sales 
form the mainstay of the local commercial economy, maize and groundnut 
cultivation provide an alternative, though somewhat limited source of revenue 
for the Ila, who display a deep-seated reluctance to sell their prized 
cattle. Other local commercial activities such as fishing and merchandizing 
have been left to the non-Ila residents who form discrete residential 
conclaves among the predominantly Ila communities. The wealth of the area is 
largely responsible for a low rate of Ila male absenteeism due to labor 
migration (11 percent), while female absenteeism due to labor migration 
remains virtually nonexistent. Periodic visitations and secondary school 
attendance, however, do provide both Ila males and females with experience in 
the non-Ila world. 
Though externally induced modernizing influences have managed over time to 
alter many aspects of Ila culture and society, such transformations have 
mostly taken place within a localized framework of expectations and goals, 
molded in long-term multiplex social relationships. What has been appraised 
as a "resistance to change" among the Ila is more properly seen as the 
priority which localized dicision-making holds in the ebb and flow of daily 
observable events. That is, the "things which really matter" -- cattle, land, 
and personnel resources have continued to be localized in the Ila 
communities, and decisions regarding these resources are typically 
circumscribed by a limited number of strategies currently viable in dealing 
with these resources. In the local arena, these decision-making strategies 
are bounded by a fluctuating field of morally and transactionally reciprocal 
ties such as kinship, clanship, co-residence, exchange partnership, 
patron-clientship, peer grouping, or voluntary association, and ordered by the 
legitimate authority of leaders and aspirants to leadership. This shifting 
field of authority exhibits varying levels of autonomy in decision-making --
the generation of rules and the ability to induce compliance to such rules --
which articulate both heirarchically and nonhierarchially. The legitimate 
authority of decision-makers among the Ila cannot, therefore, be identified 
soley by the normative structure of social relationships, since cross-cutting 
reciprocal ties often result in multiple affiliations within any field of 
authority. As a consequence, it seems more instructive to view extended case 
materials by looking at the way various fields of semi-automomy are 
articulated around a particular decision. To comprehend fully the dynamics of 
this type of analysis, and to see how this methodology may be utilized to 
assess the role of Ila women in local disputing and dispute processing, the 
structure of local leadership authority must first be addressed. 
Leadership, Decision-Making, and Remedy Agent Roles 
Typologically, leadership roles among the Ila are either traditional or 
nontraditional. Traditional leadership roles are those which arise from the 
local field of reciprocal ties, while nontraditional leadership roles are 
those which have been superimposed upon this field by an external authority: 
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the British South Africa Company, the Colonial Office, the Federation or 
Zambian governments). It is clear that the passage of time has permitted 
these roles to merge or coincide in particular leaders. Still, they remain 
distinct due to the locus of power, wherein their authority is legitimated. 
The authority embedded in traditional leadership roles, for example, is 
legitimized for the most part through insitutionalized kinship relationships, 
though tempered by age, residence, and sex. As Chart 1 on the following page 
indicates, traditional leadership roles are both residentially based, such as 
households and kraal groups, and nonresidentially based, such as bakwashi, "a 
collectivity of kraal groups," and bashimukowa, "the dispersed bilateral 
kindred." In addition to these more formalized traditional leadership roles, 
there are also the more exclusively transactional ties which generate less 
formalized leadership roles, such as in exchange partnership, patron-
clientship, peer grouping, and voluntary associations, including stocktheft 
"rings." 
On the other hand, the nontraditional leadership roles of village headman, 
ward leader, local court justice, chief, and elected local government officers 
are legitimized by both residential and nonresidential reciprocal ties of the 
traditional variety, but also in larger, nontraditional, "fabricated" adminis-
trative institutions such as villages, wards, sections, constitutencies, and 
chieftaincies. Finally, both types of leadership roles are "encapsulated" 
(Bailey, 1969) within an increasingly encompassing heirarchy of state-level 
institutions (e.g., District, Provincial, and National) whose activities 
affect and often invade the localized fields of decision-making autonomy, both 
traditional and nontraditional. 
Within this structural matrix of authority roles, local leaders of both 
type, seeking to achieve success in their leadership "enterprise," aim to 
maintain or extend their moral and transactional links within their field of 
authority, and to maintain their leadership role within that field. The 
measure of localized success inevitably means gaining a larger control over 
such scarce resources as' cattle, land, or personnel than competitors in the 
local arena, and manipulating such resources to neutralize or negate any 
perceived advantage captured by a competitor. Simultaneously the fact that 
both types of leadership roles are noninheritable allows nontraditional 
leaders to compete for authority in traditional fields, and vice versa. 
However, the cultural validity of the notion of political egalitarianism also 
opens the way for a considerable amount of aggrandizing maneuver in the 
competition for leadership roles, and in this there are pronounced di fferen-
tial opportunities between the two types of leaders. Case analysis confirms 
that the incidence and degree of aggrandizing maneuver utilized in the pursuit 
of leadership "proceeds" is indirectly proportional to the regulative mecha-
nisms which are available and realistically utilizable in any decision-making 
arena. Informants note that the threat of resource withdrawal is the most 
important regulative tactic available to them, but physical or verbal intimi-
dation including ostracism, petitions for respect of seniority or honoring 
tradition, resource incentives, and finally, the threat to appeal to a super-
ordinate authority are also mentioned as important. In view of these stated 
regulative mechanisms, and their realistic utility in decision-making arenas, 
it has become increasingly clear to local participants that nontraditional 
decision-making is less regulable, internally, than traditional 
decision-making. While traditional leaders are constrained by reciprocally 
regulative, moral and transactional links to legitimize their authority in a 
shifting authority field, nontraditional leaders are subject to transactional 
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CHART 1 - LOCAL-LEVEL LEADERSHIP ROLES AMONG THE ILA 
LEADERSHIP FIELDS LEADERSHIP ROLES LOCUS OF 
LEGITIMIZATION 
TRADITIONAL INFORMAL 
Exchange Partnership Bakwesu Property 
Patron-Clientship Creditor Cross-Cutting 
Peer Group Makando Cross-Cutting 
Voluntary Association Makando Cross-Cutting 
TRADITIONAL FORMAL 
Household Husband/Father Residential-Kin 
Kraal Group Kraal Elder Residential-Kin 
Bakwashi Mwaami Residential 
Collective-Kin 
Bashimukowa _ Any of Above Non-Residential 
Collective-Kin 
NON-TRADITIONAL 
Village Headman Re_s iden tial 
Collective-
Ward Senior Headman Kin and Non-Kin 
Ward Leader 
Constituency Party Chairman 
-
-
Chieftancy Chief Residential and 
Court Justice - Non-Residential 
Rural Councillor Collective-Kin ~nd 
Non-Kin 
State-level .Approval 
- -
" -
- , 
--
-
- -
r-
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links of much shorter duration. For the purposes of this article, and to 
understand how this difference is crucial to the role of Ila women in 
disputing and dispute processing, I turn now to an examination of the events 
surrounding legal change for women among the Ila. 
Historical Background 
One of the greatest hurdles faced by the British South Africa (B.S.A.) 
Company administrators in the initiation of direct civil administration among 
the Ila was the delineation and delegation of company-recognized leadership 
authority. Facing a widely fragmented "puzzle" of local leadership roles, the 
appointment of a "workable" number of chiefs was often quite haphazard. In 
theory, however, this mattered little since the appointed chiefs were to serve 
mainly as local administrative "fronts" for the company commisioners and 
magistrates. Accordingly, these chiefs were afforded no statutory authority 
to function as local decision-makers, that is to make or enforce 
company-sanctioned rules. In practice, however, traditional decision-making 
continued to operate in various local authority fields, and under the aegis of 
the new government chiefs, de facto "indirect" rule was fostered. The 
foundations of de jure "indirect" rule were ultimately laid when company 
magistrates called upon the local chiefs to assist in the eradication of local 
customs which had been declared "repugnant" to company conceptions of natural 
justice. 114 Magistrates, for example, had found that many customs regarding 
Ila women were substantially "unjust" -- betrothal for prepubescent girls, 
widow inheritance, institutionalized wife lending and adultery, and forced 
matrimonial reconciliation in husband-wife disputes -- and where these customs 
were the basis for a marital grievance, women were given a new legal foothold 
in the disputing process. In this, Ila chiefs were expected to provide women 
with broad access to a disputing forum, particularly when such grievances were 
not resolved to the woman's satisfaction in a traditional decision-making 
field. The immediate reaction of traditional decision-makers to the new 
procedures for making and enforcing matrimonial rules, particularly in the 
area of divorce, was resentment for this unwarranted incursion into their 
field of authority. By 1920 a district native commisioner noted that, "by 
giving women this freedom hitherto denied them, we are doing something very 
contrary to long established native views" (Namwala District Report, 1920). 
To comprehend fully the implications of company-enforced legal change for 
Ila women in disputing and dispute processing, it is necessary first to 
explicate the "long established native views" regarding marital contracts, 
marital exchanges, sexual rights and obligations, and the authority field 
typically circumscribed in marital alliances.5 To begin with, marriages 
were almost exclusively arranged by parents and guardians of the prospective 
bride and groom. This was the case regardless of the couple's age or their 
marital history, and since the element of choice was largely removed from the 
prospective husband and wife, there was always the possibility that households 
could be subject to immediate turmoil. This was most frequent where a young 
girl was married to an old man. Smith and Oale reported that, "we have known 
many cases where young girls were forced into a relationship they abhorred ... 
[they] ... cannot be expected to welcome such a state of affairs; in fact to 
our knowledge, many of them strenuously rebel, even to the extent of running 
away" (1920, v. 2: 48). Most instructive, however, is the means by which such 
marital grievances were redressed. Smith and Dale add that, "if one runs 
away, she is chased [by her own kinsmen] and brought back forcibly to her 
husband" (1920, v. 2:48). 
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The responsibility for reconciling this and other types of matrimonial 
grievance was legitimately circumscribed in the field of authority created by 
the collection, transferral, and distribution of property, usually cattle, 
known as chiko. The transfer of chiko to the wife's kinsmen established a 
husband's nonreciprocal uxorial (sexual) and genetrical (parental) rights in 
the wife, and such marital alliances often extended beyond the lifetimes of 
either spouse. Permanence, however, was far from being guaranteed in marital 
alliances though termination was largely at the husband's discretion. A 
husband could send his wife back to her kinsmen and seek the return of the 
chiko payment on the grounds of his wife's "virulent or contagious disease; 
laziness, neglect to provide the husband with food by hoeing or cooking; [or] 
inability to bear children" (Smith and Dale, 1920, v.2:51). The return of the 
chiko signified the termination of the alliance, or divorce. Still, many 
husbands were reluctant to ask for their chiko even though the wife might be 
sent back to her kinsmen for any of the above reasons. There were two main 
reasons for adopting this strategy. 
First, the alliance could only be terminated if the cattle were returned. 
Even if the wife no longer resided with her husband, he retained his marital 
rights in the woman, and access to the legal resources of her kinsmen, as long 
as the chiko was not requested or returned. For many polygynists, such 
benefits were judged to outweigh either the presence of a "troublesome" wife, 
the value of the invested chiko, or both. Since she would still be his wife, 
any man who engaged in sexual relations with the woman would be liable for an 
adultery charge, while any children born out of such illicit relationships 
would still belong to the husband's kin group. If the woman attempted to 
marry another man, both the woman's kinsmen and her new husband would be 
liable for a compensation claim, usually under threat of feud. Furthermore, 
should the original husband die without having requested the return of the 
chiko, the wife's kinsmen would be responsible to provide a new wife for the 
deceased's heir. For this, they could demand no additional payments. 
Second, and most important for the theme being developed in this section, 
marriages were not only social alliances but political alliances too. The 
authority field circumscribed in the chiko payment was an amalgamation of 
semi-autonomous fields with resource bases far surpassing that of the 
household in which they were unified. That is, the husband's or wife's role 
as a decision-maker in the household was largely subordinate to broader, more 
powerful decision-making roles which actually sanctioned decisions regarding 
the marriage alliance. A husband might seek the return of chiko, but such 
claims did not necessitate compliance by the chiko-holders. Similarly, a 
husband's claim for compensation for his departed wife's adulteries, or his 
claim for compensation should the wife attempt to remarry, could be just that 
-- a claim. Success in these claims was largely a measure of the husband's 
ability to mobilize support resources within the authority field created by 
marriage. In the field, the husband's status among his own kinsmen was just 
as important as the moral and transactional ties which reciprocally bound the 
allied affines to the wife's guardian, the actual holder of the chiko. Where 
confrontation resulted in a decision-making encounter, these political 
alignments might produce a mediated settlement, sanctioned by group 
consensus. There was, however, always the covert, or overt, threat to resort 
to shisha (property seizure through group self-help) as an ultimate sanction. 
To claim the return of chiko, therefore, a husband had to have a rather clear 
idea of just where the chips would fall if it came down to an actual physical 
encounter. 
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Into this traditional authority field, the company administrators 
introduced a nonrelated third party, the chief, who was to serve as both an 
original and appelate adjudicator, beyond the level of familial mediation. It 
is clear from the district reports that the intent was to stave off the 
potential for shisha feuding ( Ila Customary Law, 1919). Yet, the end result 
was the virtual usurpation by the local adjudicator of familial authority in 
the processing of matrimonial disputes. Losing their ablility to enforce such 
rules familial leaders were increasingly unable to function as decision-makers 
in the contracting of marital alliances. While these procedural changes 
allowed greater freedom to women in both selecting a husband and being 
divorced from him, there was another area of substantive legal change which 
promoted a more critical status change, in strictly localized economic terms. 
This change involved the sexual rights which a husband held in his wife, 
during the period of marriage, and the resources which could be accrued 
through such rights. 
While the chiko payment established a husband's sexual rights in his wife, 
extra-marital sexual relationships (institutionalized and illicit) played a 
significant part in normal household relations. The most prominent form of 
institutionalized extra-marital sexual relationships was carried out under the 
local institutions of lubambo, a type of cicisbeism, and kusena. In exchange 
for the wife's freedom to contract as many formal lubambo relationships as she 
desired, the wife was reciprocally obligated to be given (kusena) to the 
husband's friend or visitor, or exchanged for the wife of the husband's close 
friend or age-mate. Such wife-lending or wife-exchanging, which implied or 
entailed sexual intercourse, was carried out within the institutions of 
lubambo and kusena. This does not however suggest that because a husband gave 
or exchanged his wife with another man, the wife responded by contracting her 
own lubambo relationships. Clearly, there was no such one-to-one correlation; 
kusena could exist without lubambo, and vice versa. Both institutions, 
however, were accompanied by gift-giving (chi po); these gifts included such 
prized items as cattle, impande shells, or game skins, and were the sole 
property of the husband. 
In addition to the institutionalized forms of extra-marital sexual 
relationships noted above, there were noninsti tutionalized forms which were 
deemed adulterous violations (buditazhi) of matrimonial rules. Such 
adulterous relationships might be contracted with the knowledge of the 
husband, who sought to entrap a hapless victim, and then proceeded to claim 
compensation larger than that which might be included in institutionalized 
chipo. For her part in such entrapment conspiracies, the wife would sometimes 
receive a share of the compensation, though she had no legitimate basis for 
claiming a share. At other times, adulterous relationships might be 
contracted without the husband's knowledge. In these instances, the wives' 
rationale seems to have been two-fold. First, young wives who were married to 
older husbands sought younger men for more satisfactory sexual companionship. 
Second, wives of all ages might seek a partner in adultery in order to claim a 
small gift for themselves. Should the adulterer refuse, the threat implicit 
was that he would be reported to the woman's husband, and a compensation claim 
far greater than the gift requested would unquestionably result. Such 
profiteering by wives, however, was only good once, since the woman's motives 
would have been patently revealed. She would then have to find another target 
for her sexual ploy. Where a husband found his wife engaging in an illicit 
sexual relationship, whether by conspiracy or not, the adulterer was liable 
for a claim of one or two cattle, though ten was not unheard-of claim. Such 
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claims were usually pressed by the husband and a few of his more stalwart 
kinsmen, who appeared at the adulterer's hut, spears in hand. If the 
adulterer refused the charge, the wife was summoned, and a tribunal (lubeta) 
was convened on the spot. The wife's testimony about the sexual encounter, 
its time, the location, and any witnesses to the meeting, was usually enough 
to convince the tribunal of the alleged adulterer's guilt or innocence. For 
her part in the adultery, the wife was blameless, and it was expected that 
since she would neither suffer nor profit from a false allegation, she was 
most likely telling the truth. If the adulterer continued to deny the 
accusation, or refused to pay the compensation demanded, shisha sanctions 
would be invoked. In this, the wife's kinsmen, circumscribed in the 
matrimonial field of authority, were expected to participate along with the 
husband's kinsmen. If however, the adulterer agreed to the charge, but 
claimed indigence, he was taken as a slave, or both of his hands were cut 
off. With the abolition of "repugnant" sanctions, including shisha, 
enslavement, and body mutilation, claims of indigence and instances of 
nonpayment appeared more frequently. Such cases were subsequently appealed to 
the chief for adjudication. When the company magistrates noticed the new 
super-abundance of adultery litigation being processed by the chiefs, a 
commission was organized to investigate local sexual customs more closely. 
Their findings and subsequent response provoked a number of repercussions in 
husband/wife, and male/female relations. 
In 1922, a Native Commissioner declared that, the courts "will no longer 
uphold any principle which admits of a husband making gain out of his wife's 
immorality" (Namwala District Report, 1922). In their "crusade" to raise the 
moral status of their local wards, company administrators asserted that by 
altering the judicial procedure for handling disputes arising out of 
extra-marital sexual relationships, altered attitudes regarding husband/wife 
and male/female relationships would result. In this they were certainly 
correct. Yet, the results of their alterations were not quite those which had 
been anticipated. Their most fundamental error was the merging of all forms 
of extra-marital sexual relationships, and expecting that grievances arising 
from such relationships would uniformly appear as adultery disputes. 
According to the new procedure, compensation for adultery could only be 
claimed if the aggrieved husband accompanied his claim with a divorce case 
against his adulterous wife. 
The effects of the substantive merger which equated all forms of 
extra-marital sexual relationships, and the procedural unification of adultery 
and divorce litigation, were differentially apparent. That is, 
institutionalized forms of extra-marital sexual relationships (lubambo and 
kusena) remained almost intact, since these exchange relationships had 
infrequently occasioned either grievances or disputes between the males 
involved, except where the chipo was not forthcoming. In these rather 
exceptional cases, the aggrieved husband might seek to be compensated in a 
traditional forum, but if the surrogate husband refused to pay compensation, 
the reciprocal ties established in the exchange were abrogated. Since the 
reciprocal ties created in institutional extra-marital sexual relationships 
were valued above the chipo themselves, only the less than tactful would 
purposely defraud a potential ally simply for sexual intercourse. Non-
institutionalized extra-marital sexual relationships, however, were another 
matter entirely. Company-enforced legal change substantially altered the 
local patterns of adultery, and thus effected subsequent changes in 
institutionalized forms also. 
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As I noted earlier, the removal of "repugnant" sanctions (shisha feuding, 
enslavement and body mutilation) resulted in an increase in adultery 
litigation appearing before the local chiefs. There was no indication, 
however, that adultery was on the rise, only that more adulterers were failing 
to compensate the aggrieved husbands. The company's introduction of the joint 
adultery/divorce procedure succeeded in reducing adultery litigation, but the 
irony of this change was that, in the absence of a remedy perceived locally to 
be "just," the incidence of adultery increased. That is, a husband faced with 
the choice between gaining a cow or two but also losing his wife, or gaining 
nothing but keeping his wife, most often opted for the latter. The wife was, 
after all, a valuable household personnel resource, not only for the children 
which she might bear and the services which she regularly performed, but also 
for the alliances which could be created through institutionalized forms of 
extra-marital sexual relationships. Furthermore, the outcome of an 
adjudicated divorce settlement was far from routinized at this time, and the 
fact that such decisions were made by a decision-maker in an external field of 
authority only added to the uncertainty of such litigation. 
Up to this point I have primarily addressed the motivations of males in 
extra-marital sexual relationships, their grievances in such relationships, 
and their responses or nonresponses to such grievances. The motivations of 
Ila females in such relationships have been addressed only marginally, since 
in the pre-Company environment of husband/wife and male/female relationships, 
men controlled and regulated all decision-making where scarce resources were 
involved. In this social environment Ila females, wives and kinswomen alike, 
were, quite frankly, scarce resources with little authority in decision-making 
fields. To assert that women were principally pawns, manipulated to benefit 
either their husbands, their husband's kinsmen, or their own kinsmen, is not 
to underestimate their value in Ila society, only to emphasize that on a 
graduated scale of authority in decision-making fields, the aims of most women 
were subordinate to the aims of most men. There were exceptions, but these do 
not disprove the validity of the measurement. 
Company intervention, however, began altering the traditional sexual 
imbalance of power in Ila society as early as 1917. Although the statutory 
abolition of slavery and child betrothal for girls held out the potential 
opportunity for establishing social equity, actual changes were neither 
immediate nor radical at this time. There was a sense that altered status for 
Ila females was lurking on the horizon, but it was unclear just how and when 
such a change would be effected. The provision for a legal foothold in the 
authority field of a nontraditional decision-maker, the chief, and broad 
access to this field as a disputing forum, ultimately proved to be a means for 
challenging male hegemony. That such challenges were ultimately confounded 
and finally subsumed within larger political issues involving Ila males, did 
not wholly detract from the status alterations which took place during the 
succeeding decades. I will return to this topic in the following section of 
this article. For now, I will return to my discussion of Company-enforced 
legal change in the areas of extra-marital relationships and divorce. This 
time, however, I will approach the topic from the perspective of Ila females. 
The procedural unification of adultery disputes and divorce in 1922 added 
an alternative means for a woman to escape from an unhappy marriage. Prior to 
this, company magistrates had refused to uphold any settlement to a 
matrimonial dispute which included a forced reconciliation. Chiefs were 
explicitly instructed to ask each female litigant in a matrimonial dispute 
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whether or not she wished to remain married to her husband (Ila customary Law, 
1922). If she did not, and her grievance was sound, the chief was to grant an 
immediate divorce. Furthermore, any woman whose marriage had been arranged 
without her consent was to be granted a divorce if she was unhappy in her 
marriage. While this provision was implemented through the statutory ban on 
child betrothal and widow inheritance, and meant specifically for the 
protection of young girls and widows, virtually any woman could claim that her 
marriage had been arranged without her consent. This fact of pre-Company 
marriage regulations provided wives, for a time, with a potent weapon, which 
when wielded in household decision-making, as it frequently was, undermined 
the authority of their husbands enough to enhance their own status in the 
matrimonial field. The advent of marriage by mutual consent, however, served 
to undercut this advantage, but not before Ila wives had made measurable 
progress toward parity in the household. Where inequities were perceived 
which could not be reconciled, Ila wives found it quite easy to leave the 
household. By 1933 it was noted that "Ila marriages, never known for their 
stability, are becoming more unstable, and adultery is increasing" (Namwala 
District Report, 1933). 
The procedural unification of adultery and divorce proved to be an 
additional boon for status enhancement although these changes were not being 
achieved in quite the ways the company administrators had anticipated. It 
should be recalled that the company's intent was to stamp out extra-marital 
sexual relationships, and morally uplift the "lascivious character" of Ila 
sexuality. District reports from this period (1919-1929) seem to lay equal 
blame for rampant promiscuity upon both Ila males and females. One women is 
quoted at the beginning of an annual report saying, "Ba-ila women ... will not 
be content with any one man; they must seek di version elsewhere, either in 
'lubambo' or adultery" (Namwala District Notebook, 1922). Despite such 
pronouncements, however, husbands were judged to be most blameworthy for 
seeking to make profits from their wives' immorality. As a consequence, it 
was felt that if the husband's profit incentive was removed from extra-marital 
sexual relationships, women might be constrained within the "respectful" 
bounds of marital fidelity. Hindsight reveals how truly unwarranted such an 
assumption was. 
Recognizing that fewer husbands were pursuing joint adultery/divorce 
litigation, wives found it easier to profit from their own sexuality. That 
is, adultery and adultery by "entrapment," which had formerly occasioned 
claims for compensation, were altered in such a way that wives had more 
freedom in contracting adulteries without their husband's knowledge, while in 
adultery by entrapment, wives began to demand a "fair" incentive for trapping 
a lover. Should the husband not agree to provide this incentive, the implicit 
threat was that the husband would be divorced for forcing his wife to have 
intercourse with another man (kusena). In the sphere of institutionalized 
extra-marital sexual relationships, the effect was similar. Wives continued 
to conduct lubambo affairs with lovers of their choice, but began to collect 
the customary chipo for themselves. Where the husbands received nothing, such 
affairs were buditazhi, and adulterous. However, a husband who objected to 
his wife's profiteering in his traditional sphere of extending transactional 
alliances, was now left with limited judical recourse for resolving his 
grievance. Several husbands did attempt to claim for the chipo in cases 
presented to the chiefs as matrimonial disputes. In these instances, the 
husband cited the impropriety of the wife, who was calling an obvious 
adultery, lubambo, and then keeping the customary chipo for herself. If it 
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was lubambo, then the husband claimed that the chipo was his. Such cases were 
ultimately quashed by the company magistrates, and many wives claimed divorce 
from their recalcitrant husbands. Where husbands attempted to exchange or 
lend their wives (kusena), women began to demand resource incentives. Should 
the husband refuse, the threat of divorce was implicitly clear. By 1933, a 
district commissioner, assessing the campaign to eradicate extra-marital 
sexual relationships among the Ila, noted that "Adultery is on the rise, and 
married women are now prostituting themselves for their own benefit ... only 
when they are not paid do they inform their husbands" (Namwala District 
Report, 1933). 
Regardless of the perceived failures of the company's attempt to raise the 
moral status of Ila women, Ila women had managed to elevate their social 
status in both households and across other fields of authority, traditional 
and nontraditional. Owing to administrative support, a broader definition of 
the substance of matrimonial grievances and the provision of a sympathetic 
disputing forum with altered dispute procedures, women came to possess a 
greater share of scarce resources. Furthermore, these resources allowed women 
greater autonomy both within the household and among their own kinsmen. Ila 
women were no longer chattels who could be bandied about to create alliances 
of long-standing duration. Their new-found ability to maneuver in society as 
entrepreneurs was largely attributable to the ease with which divorce could be 
attained. However, the fact that status change was largely a measure of the 
wife's ability to threaten to divorce, or actually divorce, her husband proved 
to be the ultimate weakness in this process of social change. That is, to 
benefit from the new alterations in disputing and dispute processing, a woman 
had to be married. There were no chipo for unmarried women, nor could a woman 
threaten her kinsmen with divorce. At the same time, a wife had to be able to 
support herself, or remarry, if divorce was to be a valid threat. For this 
reason, divorce threats and actual divorce litigation became central to legal 
change for Ila women. 
As I noted earlier, prior to company intervention divorce procedure was 
less than routinized, and relied largely upon the political support which 
husbands could mobilize in traditional fields of authority. Company-enforced 
rules regarding divorce were more specific concerning the grounds for claiming 
divorce, but the termination of the property relationships which had 
established the alliance in the first place proved to be a much more complex 
matter. Principal among the many points in contention were questions such 
as: Should the chiko be refunded?; How much should be refunded and how much 
retained?; Who would be responsible for the recollection and refund of the 
chiko?; How should the chiko be distributed upon its return?; How should the 
chiko be substantiated in cases of long-term alliances?; Who should retain 
custody of children?; and, What will the property rights of those children be? 
Having opened this "can of worms," the magistrates' courts were soon 
swamped with an abundance of divorce-related litigation. By 1924, however, 
company rule had given way to colonial rule, and under economic pressures, 
"direct" rule was replaced by "indirect" rule with the passage of the Native 
Authority and Native Courts Ordinance of 1929. These ordinances recognized 
the former Company chiefs as native authorities, who were empowered to draft 
administrative orders, and adjudicate disputes in the constituted Native 
Authority Courts. By 1930, the Native Authority Courts had assumed most of 
the civil case load within their areas, but in dealing with female-initiated 
matrimonial and divorce disputes, and divorce settlement, many Ila chiefs 
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showed great reluctance to give definitive settlements, at all. There was 
special reluctance in disputes to involve sexual customs deemed "repugnant" by 
the former company administrators. When these problem cases were passed on to 
the new district comissioner, because they were too difficult to settle 
definitively, the district commissioner returned the cases to the Native 
Authorities with instruction that decisions would have to be rendered, no 
matter how difficult the cases might be (Namwala District Report, 193D). 
Lacking the "moral wisdom" of the company administrators who had instituted 
the new disputing procedures, and with only generalized guidelines 
disseminated by the Superior Native Authority, the native authorities were 
left to work out the details for themselves. 
Over the next thirty-five years of "indirect" rule, the Native Authorities 
experimented with their monopoly over external political resources, to 
ascertain the limits, if any, within which they could use their decision-
making authority to extend control over internal and external power 
resources. One Ila chief, for example, attempted in 1934 to allow adultery 
litigation in his court without a joint divorce case. When the district 
commissioner learned what was happening, all of these cases were quashed. 
Such acts tested the level of culpability at which the Native Authority would 
merit punitive actions by the district administrators. In this instance only 
a mildly deterring reprimand resulted. While each adjudicated dispute 
settlement offered the Native Authorities an opportunity for political 
aggrandizement, the vagueness inherent in female-initiated matrimonial and 
divorce disputes provided the most latitude for political maneuvering. There 
can be little doubt that Ila women and their kinsmen continued to reap some 
benefits from such litigation, but these gains were mostly offset by the 
enhanced power resources of the chief who adjudicated the disputes. That is, 
the authority in decision-making fields where women were most affected, was 
becoming increasingly focused on a number of individuals who formed the core 
of Native Authority hegemony. These individuals were men, and it is clear 
that their aims in extending authority in traditional fields depended upon 
gaining support from males in those authority fields. These fields of 
authority overlapped, or were merged, on a regular basis in decision-making 
regarding marriage rules and divorce settlements. Since these rules were 
largely undetermined and, therefore, highly flexible, decisions were often 
manipulated to serve political ends, often external to the actual litigants. 
In this, Ila women might stand to gain or lose status, but either way, 
decisions regarding their position in society began to reverse the trends 
begun during company rule. 
The steady movement toward the merging of traditional and nontraditional 
authority fields -- political centralization -- was substantially re-directed 
at the time of independence (1964), when it was decided that local 
administrative and adjudicative functions should be separated into discrete 
roles. Chiefs were "persuaded .•. to withdraw from their judicial functions" 
(Annual Report of the Judiciary and Magistracy, 1965, IX). Native Courts were 
then reconstituted as local courts under the Local Courts Act (1966), and 
former Native Court Assessors were appointed as local court justices. In this 
transition, traditional decision-makers, whose most favored status in Native 
Authority hegemony had allowed adjudicative affirmation of their mediated 
settlements, and nontraditional decision-makers (chiefs and headmen), 
gradually lost their status as adjudicative remedy agents. Their authority 
was systematically usurped and undermined by the decision-making authority of 
the newly constituted local court and its officers, the local court justices. 
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In the same way that native authorities had enhanced their local power base 
across a number of authority fields, local court justices began to utilize the 
vague boundaries of female-initiated matrimonial and divorce litigation for 
similar political maneuvering. Once again, the aims of aggrieved Ila females 
were subordinated to larger male/male issues in the chieftancy. In the 
following section, I will explore the contemporary context of litigation where 
at least one of the litigants is an Ila female. 
The Contemporary Context of Litigation 
Decisons which affect Ila women directly or indirectly proliferate in the 
authority fields previously noted (see Chart 1). In this section, however, I 
will be focusing upon decision-making in traditional-formal and nontraditional 
fields. Second, I will be focusing upon disputing encounters in these 
authority fields (i.e., lubeta and nkuta). I do not wish to imply that 
rule-enforcement in decision-making fields carries more weight than 
rule-making, or that rules, themselves, can be understood solely within the 
settings of disputing encounters. I am quite willing to accept the notion 
that many forms of rule-making in authority fields do not regularly give rise 
to disputes which occasion rule-enforcement. I am also willing to accept the 
notion that rule-enforcement in disputing forums may have little to do with in 
situ rule-making. Despite these concessions, I argue that disputing, as a 
process, must be seen as an integral part of rule-making across the various 
fields of authority being examined. That is, decisions regarding rule 
enforcement may be intelligible strictly from the facts presented in disputing 
encounters, but disputing itself must be viewed as an arena where the aims of 
both disputants and remedy agents interact in operations and transactions not 
specifically tied to the actual dispute being processed. By utilizing 
disputes to outline shifts in the balance of power between the fields of 
authority which intersect in the disputing arena, we are better able to 
elucidate the larger social processes of continuity and change. This is 
particularly true for understanding change in the legal status of Ila women, 
but seems to be equally relevant to any discussion of disputing and the 
distribution of power. That is, how can disputing be utilized to maintain or 
distribute power within any field of authority? In answering this question, 
the nature of law in society will be dealt with both specifically and 
generally. 
A. Litigation in Traditional-formal Authority Fields (Lubeta) 
During a three-month period of observation, there were 26 public disputing 
encounters which occurred in the 12 traditional-formal authority fields 
sampled. 6 The sex of the litigants and types of disputes processed, are 
presented in charts 2 and 3 on the following page. The predominance of 
diputes involving two males (69.23 percent) indicates, first, a male 
orientation in public disputing in these fields of authority. This 
orientation is acknowledged by both litigants and remedy agents alike, yet 
explanations for the preponderance of male/male disputes are more dificult to 
elicit. Despite this problem of elicitation, decision-makers who were 
interviewed seemed to agree that since males formed the transactional "core" 
in their fields of authority, controlling if not actually owning the majority 
of scarce resources in these fields, males were most likely to seek public 
redress of their grievances. It is recognized that grievances arising from 
the anticipated daily battle of "one-upmanship" are potentially disastrous to 
the fragile transactional solidarity which binds individuals within the 
Sex of Pai red 
Litigants 
Male-Male 
Male-Female 
Female-Male 
Female-Female 
TOTAL (26) 
CHART 2 - TRADITIONAL-FORMAL LITIGATION 
SEX OF LITIGANTS 
Sex of Paired Litigants Number of 
Disputes 
Male-Male 18 
Male-Female l 
Female-Male 6 
Female-Female l 
TOTAL 26 
CHART 3 - TRADITIONAL-FORMAL LITIGATION 
TYPES OF DISPUTES BY LITIGANTS PAIRED BY SEX 
Theft Assault Debt Adultery Matrimonial Inheritance 
3 4 4 4 0 2 
0 0 0 0 l 0 
l 0 0 0 4 l 
0 l 0 0 0 0 
4 5 4 4 5 3 
. 
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Chiko 
l 
0 
0 
0 
1 . 
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decision-making field. Male/male grievances are, therefore, treated with much 
more gravity than instances where a female member might become aggrieved. 
This is not because males are recognized to be either more combative· or 
litigious than females, but because aggrieved males are more likely (because 
of their control of scarce resources) to remove themselves and their 
supporters from the decision-making field. Such "exit" signifies a fissioning 
of group resources which can seriously undermine the residual authority of 
decision-makers' within the constituted field. Fissioning might result 
regardless of the decision-makers attempts publicly to remedy a grievance, but 
simply to overlook a grievance seems to ensure that which is not deemed 
necessarily inevitable. Group pressures might be threatened or invoked. 
Decision-makers who serve as remedy agents in public disputing argue, 
therefore, that every opportunity for reconciling even the most trivial 
greivance must be afforded to each male aligned in the authority field. 
Female members, on the other hand, typically achieve their membership 
status in the traditional field primarily through their affiliations to a 
limited number of males. That is, few females own or even control scarce 
resources independent of their male principals. Since they are primarily 
supporters within the field of authority, their capacity as decision-makers in 
most authority fields (except households) is quite limited. Most women agree 
that the threat of resource withdrawal is quite vacuous, while actual 
fissioning is mostly absurd. Furthermore, marital residence follows a pattern 
of patrilocality, and female supporters are consequently removed from the 
daily "frictions" which engender many male/male grievances. I do not suggest 
that female supporters have no reason or opportunity to feel aggrieved; they 
do, but such grievances are accorded much less attention in traditional 
decision-making fields. Access to public forums in traditional 
decision-making fields may be permitted to female supporters pursuing a 
serious grievance (assault or theft) , but more "trivial" grievances (such as 
breach of contract or debt), which are given almost immediate public hearing 
if two males are involved, are steered to more informal disputing channels or 
negotiation. An aggrieved woman who approaches a traditional leader, seeking 
a public forum in which to dispute, may be told that her grievance is no 
matter for lubeta and that she should take up this matter with her male 
principals (makando), allowing them to decide (ku betaka) the matter. Where 
intra-group female/male grievances usually involve a woman and her male 
principals, this sugggestion is tantamount to tabling the matter. Aggrieved 
females in these instances may then either "lump" their grievance by pursuing 
it no further, or escalate their grievance to another decision-making field. 
The threat to escalate may provoke an immediate lubeta to air the woman's 
grievance, but most often the threat to escalate is taken as a challenge to 
the authority of decision-makers within the field. This decision to challenge 
involves a considerable amount of cost accounting for both men and women, 
litigants and remedy agents. For a woman who lacks independent means of 
support, however, the benefits gained through such grievance escalation are 
frequently less than the support which may subsequently be denied to her. 
In examining the eight incidences of public lubeta where a female was 
involved as a litigant, the first thing that is apparent is that more than 
half of the disputes (five) concerned a husband and wife. From the facts 
which I outlined in the last section regarding the nature of marital alliances 
and the field of authority circumscribed in the collection and distribution of 
chiko, it should not be surprising that matrimonial disputes are matters of 
public lubeta. First, the threat of evacuation is quite real. An aggrieved 
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wife who 
encounter 
is not allowed to present 
will unquestionably leave her 
her grievance 
household. One 
in a public disputing 
female argued: 
I am not their slave. They did not buy me with the 
chiko. I must respect my husband and relatives. This is 
what we learn at chisungu (female initiation). But, when 
they do not respect me, I must tell them about this. When 
I have a case (mulandu) there must be a lubeta so that I 
can say what this one has done to me. When there is 
something bad, I must tell my father. Then we can see 
what can come of this (Matrimonial Dispute Survey 
Interview, MD-V9-6/ll/78). 
Even then, an unsatisfactory dispute settlement may provoke an exit 
strategy (see Dispute 2). Second, a wife's departure to her father's or 
guardian's residence moves the grievance from the husband's authority field to 
that of his in-laws. Having allowed the grievance to get this far, a husband 
who wishes to reconcile with his wife will have to negotiate with his father-
in-law, or participate in a lube ta at his father-in-law's residence. In 
either instance, a husband will normally secure the return of his wife only if 
he agrees to pay a reconciliation fee, usually one cow, or if he acknowledges 
some fault in the dispute. For these reasons, when a wife threatens to return 
to her village, a husband who is truly desirous of continuing the marriage 
alliance will ask for, or participate in, a residential lubeta. 
The five matrimonial disputes recorded in my sample of traditional-formal 
litigation are presented in synoptic form below. The first four involved a 
wife's grievance against her husband, while the fifth involved a husband's 
grievance against his wife. 
Dispute 1 (MD-V4-5/9/78) 
In this dispute the wife complained that her husband was too 
lazy to plow a maize garden for her. She complained that he spent 
much time at the beer hall instead of plowing. The husband responded 
that he had been unable to collect his plowing oxen because of the 
rains, and that even if he did plow, there was no fertilizer at the 
agricultural cooperative. The remedy agent and his designated 
assessors, who jointly headed the lubeta, castigated the husband for 
his laziness and drunkenness, arguing that if he failed to plow for 
his wife, she would be right to leave him. None of them, it was 
noted, had used fertilizer this year. Still they had plowed, and he 
was only making excuses to avoid work. For the present, one of the 
assembly agreed to lend the husband plowing oxen so that the matter 
could be resolved. The field was plowed, and the maize subsequently 
planted without fertilizer. In this instance, the dispute went no 
further. 
Dispute 2 (MD-V9-6/ll/78) 
In this dispute the wife complained that her husband was 
neglecting her and spending too much time with his "girlfriends." 
She claimed that her husband had recently spent several days in town 
with one of his girlfriends. While he was buying this woman beers, 
his wife and two children were "suffering without him." The husband 
admitted that he had been staying with his girlfriend in town, but 
that he had gone there to buy cooking oil and cloth for his wife. 
Furthennore, be argued that because of his father's wishes, he was 
seeking another wife. The woman with whom he had spent time in town 
was being considered as a possible wife. 11My wife only complains 
because she is jealous and does not wish a co-wife," he argued. When 
the cloth and cooking oil had been brought to show the assembly, and 
the wife had agreed that her husband was showing her proper sexual 
attention, the husband's father chided her. "You cannot stop your 
husband from seeking another wife if you are not suffering, 11 he 
concluded. The wife, however, would not accept this settlement and 
travelled to her father's residence with her two children the 
following week. There was no lubeta there, but her father told the 
husband that he could not force his daughter to be married where she 
was unhappy. If the husband truly sought reconciliation, he would 
have to give up his search for a second wife. In this the husband 
agreed, and the relationship with the girlfriend was terminated. A 
few days afterwards, the household was reunited. 
Dispute 3 (MD-Vll-4/3/78) 
In this dispute the wife complained that she had found her 
husband tampering with her "cloth of the monthly period." "When I 
asked him what he was doing, 11 she stated, 11he said that he was taking 
it to the herbal doctor (munganga) so that it could be treated with 
medicine to make me pregnant. 11 The wife admitted that they had no 
children because of her. "He has children with the other wives," she 
noted. Her main objection was that the husband was going about the 
treatment in private. The husband agreed that this was wrong, and 
that if she was truly willing, they would go for treatment together. 
To this she agreed. 
Dispute 4 (MD-Vl2-4/23/78) 
In this dispute the wife complained that while she was away 
attending a funeral of one of her relatives, her husband took the 
mosquito net from her house and gave it to the second wife. When she 
returned from the funeral, the wife found a tattered mosquito net in 
place of her own. 11I am the senior wife (nabukando), 11 she argued, 
"and my husband was wrong to take the mosquito net from my house. 11 
The husband admitted that he took the mosquito net in his senior 
wife's absence, because the second wife was complaining that her net 
was no gpod. "I wanted to buy another mosquito net at the stores 
be fore nabukando returned, 11 he said, 11but there were none for sale." 
The husband argued that he could not ask the second wife to give up 
her net, nor could he ask the senior wife to be without a mosquito 
net. In response to his apparent quandary, the remedy agent sugges-
ted that he should give his own mosquito net to his senior wife. 
"When you buy a new net," the. remedy agent concluded, "you should 
give it to your senior wife. 11 In this all were agreed. 
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Dispute 5 (MD-V2-6/2/78) 
In this dispute, a husband who was residing with his in-laws 
complained that his wife was having sexual intercourse with other 
men, and telling people at the beer hall that she was no longer 
married. She had stopped cooking food for him, and had taken all her 
household goods from their house. "Since we are not divorced," he 
argued, "she must honor me as her husband." The wife argued that her 
husband beat her many times and for no proper reason when was drunk. 
"He spends all of his money for beer," she complained, "and has never 
given me even one ngwee for biscuits." The wife I s guardian then 
proceeded to berate the husband, noting that he was too quarrelsome 
when he was drunk, and that was why his own blood wanted to get rid 
of him. "Now, 11 the guardian concluded, "you promised to pay chiko, 
but from the start of your marriage to my daughter, you have paid 
nothing. 11 Finally, the guardian pronounced that there never was a 
proper marriage, so there could be neither reconciliation nor 
divorce. Several days later, the husband escalated the dispute to 
the nontraditional disputing forum, Mungaila Local Court. There, he 
found a degree of success. (see "The Son-in-law's Dubious Success" 
below). 
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In the remaining three incidences of public lubeta where at least one 
female was involved as a litigant, two concerned a woman's grievance against a 
male kinsman regarding ownership and control of a scarce resource, cattle. 
The third dispute concerned two females, sisters-in-law, who were involved in 
an affray. 
In the first female/male dispute, a sister had instructed her brother to 
take one of her oxen for sale. This accomplished, a portion of the proceeds 
were handed over to the sister. According to her wishes, the remainder of the 
proceeds was to be used for the purchase of young stock. When the sister 
inquired at a later date about the status of her requested purchase, the 
brother allegedly responded that three calves had been purchased. Then, when 
the sister asked to see the new calves, her brother reported that all three 
had died. "If my calves died," the sister queried, "why did my brother not 
inform me as he is supposed to do?" Her brother then argued that because of 
the rains, he could not know about all the cattle he was herding. "Some are 
lost in the bush," he added, "and many have died from the sickness." He 
admitted that his sister's calves might not be dead, but only lost. The 
members of the lubeta decided, therefore, that the matter should wait until 
the rains ended. When the cattle were collected a few months later, and the 
sister's calves were declared lost, she escalated her grievance to the local 
court. 
In the second female/male dispute, a daughter complained that her deceased 
father's successor (her father's younger brother) was refusing to give her a 
"fair" share of the deceased' s estate. The successor had offered her two 
cattle as a share lukona and agreed to extend the loan (inshishe) of another 
three cattle. The daughter, however, wanted twenty cattle as her share. The 
successor, who was also heading the lubeta, argued in response to the claim 
that, "I am the successor and it is for me to decide about the size of the 
shares." Though the daughter and her brother continued to grumble at that 
declaration, the discussion was closed. This grievance was also escalated to 
the local court. 
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In the final dispute, two sisters-in-law were paired as litigants. In 
this dispute, the wife complained that while she was at the beer hall a fight 
took place outside. The wife went outside with her friend, and during the 
affray one of the combatants threw a bottle of beer at her. The wife noted 
that in response, she had given the woman a firm push. The woman who was 
pushed then went into the beer hall, and returned shortly with the wife's 
sister-in-law. The wife alleged that the sister-in-law then proceeded to 
insult her, and finally hit her over the head with a chair. Because of this, 
the wife was claiming K20 (approximately $26) as compensation. The sister-
in-law, when given her turn to speak, argued that the wife was wrong to have 
pushed an obviously pregnant woman. The sister-in-law denied, however, that 
she hit the wife with a chair. The informal context of the lubeta was 
particularly so in this dispute, and both litigants were addressed in the 
manner which a parent uses to scold a wayward child. There could be no doubt 
that many of the assembly found the retelling of events surrounding the 
grievance humorous. When the claim for compensation was presented by the 
wife, there were audible chortles and exclamatory interjections. After an 
almost jocular verbal reprimand which asserted that sisters-in-law ought not 
to be quarreling, the matter was dismissed. The wife, however, found little 
reason for amusement and decided that she would take the matter to the local 
court. 
B. Litigation in Non-Traditional Authority Fields (Nkuta) 
At a higher level of incorporation than the disputing field constituted by 
the traditional-formal lubeta, are the nontraditional disputing forums known 
as nkuta. These nkutas are of two distinct types; those of the former native 
authon ties, which I refer to as quasi-adjudicative, and the local court, 
which is the only forum with formal government sanction.7 
The present ~dispute setting of the chief's nkuta closely replicates that 
of the former Native Authority Court, and the present local court. Personnel 
in the quasi-adjudicative forums , assessors, clerks, and retainers -- have 
been retained from the former Native Authority Courts, and formal procedures 
for eliciting testimony and giving evidence have been continued. While a few 
male and female litigants continue to utilize the chief's nkuta for reasons of 
convenience, immediacy of action, respect for the chief, or a mistaken 
conception of "proper" judicial procedure, the majority of litigants who seek 
to redress their grievances in the chief's nkuta were found to share a moral 
(i.e. kinship) or transactional (i.e. property) link with the chief. The 
chief's settlements appeared more predictable because of this regulative 
factor in sanctioning decisions. A litigant who shares no link with the 
chief, however, cannot be coerced to participate in a disputing encounter at 
the chief's nkuta, and many who willingly attend this forum withdraw when they 
sense that a favorable settlement is unlikely. Finally, for those outside the 
chief's authority field who do participate up to the declaration of the 
settlement, there is the recognition that the chief's settlements may be 
difficult if not clearly impossible to sanction. In sharp contrast, the Local 
court has coercive summoning authority, and failure to comply with the court's 
settlements is a criminal offense occasioning a monetary fine, imprisonment, 
or both. Though local court settlements may be less predictable and less 
regulable than settlements reached in alternative disputing forums, they are 
clearly more enforceable. 
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Since there are alternative disputing forums within the nontraditional 
fields of authority, and because these forums have vigorously competed for the 
power resources, both material and nonmaterial, which accrue in the processing 
of disputes, a litigant's selection of one forum over another, as well as his 
decision to escalate a grievance or challenge a mediated settlement, involves 
a considerable amount of political "cost-accounting." Where there is strong 
antipathy among alternative nontraditional remedy agents, such accounting 
becomes even more crucial. Most litigants are acutely aware of this political 
dimension in local dispute processing, and attempt to use it to their own 
advantage wherever and whenever they can. A few are actually successful at 
this. This was previously demonstrated by females' utilization, or threat to 
utilize, the Native Authority Court to enhance their own status within 
traditional fields of authority. However, there is always the inherent danger 
that the long-term political aims of remedy agents may overshadow the proces-
sing of a particular dispute, to the extent that litigants may actually be 
penalized for attempting to play alternative remedy agents off against each 
other. The validity of this assertion is clearly apparent in the manipulation 
of normative rules by the remedy agent, and the variability in dispute 
settlements where the same rules are invoked. This will be demonstrated in 
the extended analysis of three disputes, which I have included in this 
section. In addition to these cases, I will attempt to supplement my argument 
with statistical inferences from my entire sample population. In this, I will 
particularly emphasize variability in escalation rates, the general varia-
bility of settlements in escalated disputes, and the specific variability of 
settlements in divorce disputes. 
During a six-month period of observation, there were 143 cases processed 
as "civil" disputes by the local court. 8 Charts 4 and 5 on the following 
page show the sex of litigants in these disputes, and the types of disputes 
which these litigants, paired by sex, were pursuing.9 
As observed in the traditional-formal lubeta, there is a predominance of 
male-male litigation at the local court. More than two-thirds (67.l percent) 
of all litigation processed in this forum involved two males. On the other 
hand, only three disputes, or 2.1 percent of the sample, invloved two female 
litigants. As in traditional-formal lubeta, I argue that this relative 
absence of female-female disputes is more a product of the differential 
control of scarce resources which underlies the male-defined scale of dispute 
"gravity," than the absence of actual female-female grievances. 
Inter-sex (male-female and female-male) disputes account for almost 
one-third (30.8 percent) of the disputes processed by the local court. More 
than half (52.3 percent) of the inter-sex disputes, however, involved divorce, 
which by definition of the local court's jurisdiction, were matters for 
adjudication. That is, there are no divorces apart from those granted by the 
local court. It is more instructive, therefore, to consider inter-sex divorce 
litigation and other inter-sex disputes separately. Within this latter 
category, there were nine property-related disputes (inheritance, debt, or 
theft), seven disputes involving physical or verbal encounters (assault or 
insult), one dispute involving the custody of a child, two disputes concerning 
a false accusation, and two disputes concerning a matrimonial grievance. 
These 21 disputes are categorized in Chart 6 according to the kinship rela-
tions of the paired litigants, and the type of dispute involved. What appears 
as most important in this chart is the fact that two-thirds (14) of the 
inter-sex disputes processed by the local court, excluding divorce, involved 
CHART 4 - NON-TRADITIONAL LITIGATION (LOCAL COURT) 
SEX OF LITIGANTS 
Sex of Paired Litigants Number of 
Disputes 
Male-Male 96 
Male-Female 5 
Female-Male 39 
Female-Female 3 
TOTAL 143 
CHART 5 - NON-TRADITIONAL LITIGATION (LOCAL COURT) 
TYPES OF DISPUTES BY LITIGANTS PAIRED BY SEX9 
Types of Disputes Male-Female Female-Male Female-Female 
Inheritance 1 2 0 
Debt 0 2 1 
. 
Theft 0 4 0 
False Accusation 2 0 1 
Matrimonial 2 0 0 
Divorce 0 23 0 
Assault 0 5 1 
Insult 0 2 0 
Abduction 0 1 0 
TOTAL (47) 5 39 3 
21 
22 
CHART 6 -- RELATION OF LITIGANTS IN INTE~-SEX DISPUTES BY TYPE OF DISPUTE 
Female-Male Disputes Male-Female Disputes 
Types of Dispute Number Kin Non'-Kin Kin Non-Kin 
Property 9 7 1 1 0 
Physical/Verbal 7 1 6 
- -Encounter 
Custody 1 1 0 
- -
False Accysation 2 
- - 2 0 
Matrimonial 2 
- - 2 0 
, TOTAL 21 9 7 5 0 
litigants who were related either consanguineally or affinally. When divorce 
disputes are similarly excluded from the entire case sample, the percentage of 
disputes involving relatives of either sex is 40 percent. For intra-sex, 
male-male disputes, 34 percent of the paired litigants are related. The 
question which thus emerges is why males and females who are related appear in 
proportionately twice as many disputes as disputing males who are related, and 
disputing females who are related. The answer to this question is partially 
addressed by examining the pattern of grievance escalation in inter-sex 
disputes, where the litigants are related. 
CHART 7 -- GRIEVANCE SCALATION PATTERN FOR RELATED LITIGANTS IN INTER-SEX DISPUTES 
Related Litigants Number of "Was Grievance Previous l v aired in 'lubeta '?" 
Paired by Sex Grievances Yes No 
Male-Female 5 5 0 
Female-Male 9 2 7 
TOTAL 14 7 7 
At a glance, this chart indicates that one-half the litigants in inter-sex 
disputes have initially pursued their grievances in traditional-formal forums 
(lubeta). Of the remaining half, one dispute was originally aired at the 
chief's nkuta, while the remaining six were initially aired at the local 
court. while aggrieved males in inter-sex disputes clearly demonstrated their 
preference for the lubeta as a point for initiating their disputes with 
related females, aggrieved females in inter-sex disputes showed a marked 
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reluctance to initiate their disputes with related males in the traditional-
formal forums. That is, 78 percent of the aggrieved females in inter-sex 
disputes involving a male kinsman opted for a disputing forum other than the 
lubeta. To put this single aspect of inter-sex disputing within a larger 
comparative framework, I have included the charts below which delineate the 
initiation point of all sample disputes processed by the local court. Once 
again, divorce disputes have been excluded from the case population. 
CHART 8 - INITIATION POINT OF DISPUTE/ DISPUTING FORUM BY RELATION OF LITIGANTS 
. 
Initiation Point Related Lit1gants Unrelated Litigants 
Number % Number % 
"l ubeta" 30 62.5 6 8.33 
Chief's "nkuta" 7 12.5 6 8.33 
Local Court 11 25 60 83.33 
TOTAL(120) 48 100 72 100 
CHART 9 - INITIATION POINT OF DISPUTE/ DISPUTING FORUM BY SEX AND RELATION OF LITIGANTS 
Initiation Point Male-Male Inter-Sex Female-Female 
Re'lated Unre ated Related unre atect Ke Iatect unre 
No. % NO. 7, NO. 7, NO. 7, NO. 7, NO. 
"l ubeta'' 22 67 6 9.5 7 50 0 - 1 100 0 
Chief's "nkuta 11 6 18 6 9.5 1 7 0 - 0 - 0 
Local Court 5 15 51 81 6 43 7 100 0 - 2 
TOTAL(120) 33 100 63 100 14 100 7 100 1 100 2 
The comparative analysis of points of dispute initiation indicates, most 
importantly, that aggrieved females involved in inter-sex disputes with a male 
kinsman tend to treat these disputes as if they involved a nonrelative. The 
female litigants in each of the inter-sex disputes involving a male kinsman 
were interviewed regarding their decision either to appeal a decision from a 
lubeta, or to escalate their grievance immediately to the local court. The 
two females who had initiated their disputes in lubeta, felt that the settle-
ments in these forums were unfair, and that they had very little to lose in 
appealing the previous settlements. The court's settlements ultimately sub-
stantiated their beliefs that there was some possibility of gain by appealing 
to the nontraditional forum. 
atea 
7, 
-
-
100 
100 
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In the case of the sister's cattle which "mysteriously" got lost, the 
brother was ordered to give his wife three calves or Kl00 (approximately 
$135). For the daughter who complained that her father's successor was not 
offering her a fair share of the estate, the altered settlement was seven 
cattle (lukona) and three cattle (inshishe). The remaining five women 
admitted, from past experience, their reluctance to pursue property-related 
disputes in the traditional lubeta, since the male-biased partiality in these 
forums seemed to make an unfavorable settlement highly predictable. While it 
was widely known that partiality was not absent in the nontraditional forum 
either, experience and gossip had indicated that favorable settlements might 
be easier to obtain at the local court. In each of these disputes a favorable 
settlement did in fact obtain, and each of the female disputants seemed 
quietly pleased with the outcome of the dispute. None, however, wanted to 
appear boastful for fear of inciting their kinsman's wrath. For indeed, if he 
failed to follow the settlement, the woman's only recourse would be to report 
this failure to the court. A "contempt" case would then follow, and if the 
kinsman was imprisoned, the woman's position among her kinsmen would unques-
tionably suffer. Though she had treated him as a nonkinsman in her decision 
to escalate her grievance to the nontraditional forum, she would now have to 
repair their breach if she wanted the benefits of the settlement that was 
awarded. Indi victual and group sanction, therefore, continue to operate even 
within the framework of adjudication. 
For the five male litigants who utilized the local court to dispute with a 
female relative, four were seeking the adjudicative affirmation of a settle-
ment reached in a traditional-formal lubeta, while the fifth male litigant was 
seeking to appeal the settlement of the lubeta (see dispute 5, above). In the 
four instances where adjudicative affirmation was sought by male litigants, 
this aim was realized twice; once in a matrimonial dispute, and once in an 
inheritance dispute. In one of the cases involving false accusation, the 
lubeta•s assignment of guilt was affirmed, but the settlement altered down-
ward. In the remaining case which involved an allegedly false accusation, the 
lubeta's decision was reversed, and the male plaintiff was ordered to compen-
sate his female relative for the property which he had, "in fact" stolen. 
While the local court's reluctance to serve as an adjudicative "rubber stamp" 
for the settlements rendered in traditional-formal forums is not the only 
factor which inhibits males from initially escalating their grievances with 
related females to the nontraditional disputing forum, it is clearly impor-
tant. Furthermore, where the local court's settlements are often unpredic-
table, resulting in lower compensation settlements and settlement reversals, 
there is an obvious incentive to confine the dispute within the boundaries of 
a traditional field of authority. Where settlement reversal is actually 
sought, however, there is the reverse incentive to appeal to the authority of 
the nontraditional forum. While this has been demonstrated in female-male 
disputes involving related litigants, it is equally true for aggrieved males 
who doubt the fairness of a lubeta's settlement, yet lack the power resources 
necessary to regulate the decisions of these forums. This is particularly 
evident in the case of the aggrieved son-in-law who appealed his matrimonial 
dispute to the local court. This case is presented below. 
Local Court Case 1 - "The Son-in-law's Dubious Success" (L.C., 
308/9-20-78) 
(Charge is read by the court clerk, plea is submitted, witness is 
asked to leave the court, plaintiff speaks first). 
Plaintiff: I eloped with the defendant in March 1974. At this time I 
could pay nothing. When the defendant's parents claimed KlOO as 
compensation for elopement, I went to town to collect money. When I 
returned, I found that they had snatched my bicycle. When we came 
back from Itezhi-tezhi in May, they claimed for nothing else. Then 
they claimed for two cattle and K200. At that time, I had no money so 
I went to Livingstone. I returned with K60, but they would not allow 
me to have my wife until I paid them everything. Then I found a love 
letter from Mucheswa in my wife I s handbag. I took this letter to my 
father-in-law, but he would do nothing. Then I found the defendant 
doing sex with Mucheswa outside the beer hall. I snatched his 
clothing and took him naked to my father-in-law. There, Mucheswa 
admitted the adultery, but then he ran away to the city. When I 
questioned the defendant about all of this, she denied ever doing sex 
with him. I was very angry about this, but I never ever beat her. 
The next time I found her at the beer hall, I told her that we should 
go sleep together, but she refused. Then she began to tell people 
that we were no longer married. Now because we are not sharing a 
house, I asked her to share with me some of our blankets, but she 
refused. This is when the matter was heard by the headman. The 
defendant said that if she had to remain married to me, she would 
surely kill herself. So the headman said that we could not be 
married. Now this is not what I want, so I have offered to pay 
chiko. Then I heard that Job is seeking to marry the defendant, and 
we are not even divorced: We still sleep together, so I don I t know 
why the defendant says that we are no longer married. That is all. 
(Defendant is now given the opportunity to cross-examine the 
plaintiff). 
Defendant: Why did you beat me so many times? 
Plaintiff: When I beat you, it was because I never knew where you were. 
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Defendant: Why don I t you respect my relatives? Why do you even say that 
my father is a fool? 
Plaintiff: I never said that. 
Defendant: Why do you say that we are still sleeping together? 
Plaintiff: We did so just on Saturday night. 
Defendant: If we 
Plaintiff: I do. 
are married, why do you never support me? 
I gave you K5 and then K3 for beer on Saturday. 
Defendent: Why do you talk about Saturday night? 
accompany you. 
Plaintiff: I never forced you to accompany me. 
You forced me to 
Defendant: If you say that we are still married, why do you claim for your 
K60. 
Plaintiff: I never did that. 
Defendent: Didn't you collect the goods from my house? 
Plaintiff: I never did that. 
Defendant: You collected those things because you want to be divorced. 
Isn't that so? 
Plaintiff: I do not wish to be divorced. 
(The court justices now cross-examine the plaintiff). 
Court: 
Plaintiff: 
Are you prepared to pay the chiko? 
Yes, I have K140 even now. 
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Court: 
Plaintiff: 
If you have this money, why haven't you paid your father-in-law? 
I couldn't because the defendant was making me very angry. 
Court: If you suppose that Job has already paid chiko to your father-
in-law why don't charge him here? ---
Plaintiff: My wife denies that Job wants to marry her. 
Court: What about your father-in-law? 
Plaintiff: I only hear Job wants to give him the money. 
(The Defendant now speaks). 
Defendant: The plaintiff and I became lovers in 1973. We eloped, and the 
plaintiff never paid any chiko. Then in 1974, my father agreed to accept 
chiko, demanding two cows and K200. Up to this time the plaintiff has 
only paid K60, and we now have two children. Lately, the plaintiff has 
been very cruel to me, and beats me frequently for no good reason. When 
our child died, we were staying at Itezhi-tezhi. I wanted to return home 
for the funeral, but the plaintiff locked me in the house and beat me when 
I tried to escape. We finally came back in May, and my father told the 
plaintiff that he must now pay the chiko. So the plaintiff went to town 
to collect some money. He returned with another K60, but I told my father 
not to accept it because the plaintiff is so cruel to me. Once the 
plaintiff beat me at the beer hall. After that he went to my house and 
collected all of my household goods. We reported this matter to the Chief 
Mungaila, and the chief's retainer recollected these goods from the 
plaintiff. The chief said that if there was a dispute that we should have 
a lubeta to decide the matter. We did so, and it was decided that we are 
divorced because he is too cruel, and pays no chiko to my father. That is 
all. 
(Plaintiff now cross-examines the defendent) 
Plaintiff: When was I ever cruel to you without good cause? 
Defendant: You've been cruel to me since 1975 without any reason. 
Plaintiff: Why do you only complain about this now? 
Defendant: I was too far away from my relatives when we were staying at 
Itezhi-tezhi. 
Plaintiff: Why did I beat you that time at Itezhi-tezhi? 
Defendant: It was because I wanted to come home for the funeral of our 
child. 
Plaintiff: Didn't I beat you because of two adulteries? 
Defendant: No. I don't know about the two men you have mentioned. 
Plaintiff: What about the time at the beer hall. Why did I beat you then? 
Defendant: You beat me because you don't love me. 
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Plaintiff: Didn't I beat you because I found you doing sex with Mucheswa? 
Defendant: Never. 
Plaintiff: Mucheswa admits doing sex with you there! 
Defendant: I don't know what he says. 
(Defendant's witness is now called to speak). 
Witness: There can be no reconciliation here. The plaintiff never pays 
me any chiko. He always says that he will pay me, but he never has done 
so. I'm tired of his promises. There are two children already. Now that 
the plaintiff has collected his goods from the defendant's house it is 
clear that he wants divorce. It should be so. My daughter threatens to 
hang herself if she must remain married to this man. I cannot force her 
to return to him if she will only kill herself. There can be no reconci-
liation. That is all. 
(Plaintiff now cross-examines the witness). 
Paintiff: Why do you tell the defendant to divorce me? 
Witness: I don't tell her that. It is her wish. 
Plaintiff: Have I ever been disrespectful to you? 
Witness: No, in that way you have been good. 
Plaintiff: Has Job offered to pay you chiko? 
Witness: No. 
(The court justice now cross-examine the witness). 
Court: 
Witness: 
Court: 
Witness: 
Court: 
Witness: 
Court: 
Witness: 
Court: 
Witness: 
Court: 
Witness: 
Court: 
Witness: 
Court: 
Witness: 
Did the plaintiff tell you that he was willing to pay the chiko? 
Yes, but he always tells me that he has money, when he has none. 
If he pays you chiko, can the marriage be reconciled? 
No. The defendant threatens to kill herself. I've seen the 
rope. 
What about this adultery matter with Mucheswa? 
The plaintiff brought this man to my house at night. 
Did Mucheswa agree to the adultery? 
Yes. 
Did you ask the defendant about this matter? 
Yes, she admitted everything. 
Has 
No. 
Job offered to give you chiko for your daughter? 
I know nothing about th~ 
What were you talking about with Job at the beer hall? 
We were only sharing beers. 
If the plaintiff agrees to pay the chiko, can the marriage be 
reconciled? 
Ha~ He will never pay even one ngwee. 
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(The court justices retire to their chambers to consider the settlement). 
Judgement: This marriage is reconciled. You, defendant are the one who 
wants to be free of the marriage for no good reason. You commit adulte-
ries and your husband never knows where you are sleeping. He is right to 
beat you for misbehaving. This is not cruelty. 
You, plaintiff, must now pay your father-in-law what you owe. If you fail 
to do so in thirty days, then there can be a divorce case. If anyone is 
not satisfied with this judgement, you have thirty days to appeal to the 
magistrate up to the high court. Out of the boxes. 
~n subsequently reviewing the court's settlement for my benefit, the court 
justices asserted that their decision was based primarily upon their assess-
ment of the wife's fault in the dispute. They argued that the father-in-law 
had actually confirmed his daughter's fault by agreeing that Mucheswa admitted 
to having an adulterous relationship with the defendant. The failure of the 
plaintiff to pay chiko over a period of three years, and the defendant and her 
father's wish that the marriage should be terminated, were deemed peripheral 
to the dispute. That is, it was the wife's adulteries which were responsible 
for the trouble in her marriage. If the husband wished to reconcile his 
marriage with such an "obviously troublesome woman," he should be allowed to 
do so. There was, however, the stipulation that the plaintiff would have to 
demonstrate his willingness by paying the chiko demanded, within thirty 
days. This stipulation, as it turned out, was the hook upon which the 
favorability of the settlement ultimately hung. 
In subsequently reviewing the court's settlement with the defendant's 
father, the argument was presented that the defendant's adultery was periphe-
ral to the dispute being processed. That is, the "true" problem in the 
marriage was the plaintiff's failure to pay chiko. Without this payment, the 
father argued, there was no marriage at all, and the plaintiff had no legiti-
mate right to demand or expect his wife's fidelity. The defendant's sexual 
affairs, therefore, were her own concern, and certainly not blame-worthy. "If 
this was adultery," the defendant's father queried, "why has no compensation 
been claimed?" When I asked the defendant's father to explain why he and the 
court had reached such different conclusions about the same facts presented in 
the dispute, he responded quite simply, "We see many things differently." 
This, as I can verify from both my historical and contemporary case 
survey, was quite true. In the well-known rivalry between the alternative 
remedy agents in the nontraditional field of authority, the defendant's father 
was a supporter of the local court's staunchest adversaries. This adversarial 
relationship had developed through a number of controversial dispute settle-
ments by the local court, in which political retribution was claimed by the 
losing litigants. These complaints, which were subsequently brought to the 
attention of district and provincial officials, led to the convening of an 
investigative commission. This commission uncovered judicial partiality on 
the part of both disputing forums, and though no resolutions emerged, the 
fevered pitch of retributory justice was cooled off, somewhat. The chief's 
supporters, however, continued to claim that "We have no court," in response 
to counter-claims that "We have no Chief." 
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There was, thus, much political capital to be made by the local court in 
the reversal of the "unfavored" remedy agent's settlement in the dispute cited 
above. Yet, the style of the settlement, as well as its actual content, 
managed to please, if not placate, each of the litigants, while enhancing the 
legitimacy of the local court as a disputing forum. That is, the plaintiff 
won a measure of victory in the reversal of the lubeta•s settlement. In this 
he exhibited noticeable glee. Yet, his success was dubious, since he did not 
in fact have the chiko as he had claimed in the disputing encounter. Further-
more, as a well-known credit risk he appeared most unlikely to amass the 
required chiko within the allotted period of time. For that reason, the 
defendant I ,ad wun too. She would not have to return to her husband, anti was 
free, after 30 days, to seek a new husband. In this, her father would recoup 
his losses from the present chiko-less marriage. But, above all, the local 
court managed to assuage the potential for the needless waste of authority 
resources in support of recognized wastrel. That is, the court was able to 
reaffirm its authority to reverse the dispute settlements of traditional-
formal forums, while nevertheless ensuring the same eventual outcome. In 
this, the independent assessment of guilt had provided the means for political 
maneuver as well as the maximization of judicial resources. The divorce 
dispute related in excerpted form below adds further emphasis to these points, 
by looking at a field of disputing necessarily restricted to the local court. 
Local court case 2 - "The Case of the Malodorous Pudendum" (L.C. 
121/7-17-78) 
(Charge is read by the court clerk, plea is submitted witness is 
asked to leave the court, plaintiff speaks first). 
PLaintiff: On the day the Chikamona died, I asked the plaintiff if I 
might attend the funeral. The defendant agreed to this. While I was 
at the funeral, I went to the beer hall with my sister. I found the 
defendant already there, but nothing was said. The next day I went 
home because the funeral was ended. That night I went to the beer 
hall, once again, with my sister. After we had been there some time 
sharing beers, the defendant came to where we were sitting and 
started to insult us. He said that I was a fool for having gone to 
the beer hall when I was supposed to be at the funeral. He said that 
my vagina was smelly, and even threatened to beat my sister, insis-
ting that she was helping me to find boyfriends. The next morning he 
went to my relatives to claim for the return of his chiko. He told 
me to take my things and leave my house. He stopped me from cooking 
food, and told me that we must be divorced. He said that I should 
remain with only two of the chiko cattle that he would keep my 
blankets. My guardian reported this matter to the chief Mungaila, 
where the defendant agreed to have divorced me. Then the defendant 
tried to collect his cattle from my relatives, Chuumpu and 
Namakamba. They refused because they said that there was no proper 
divorce certificate. Now I have summoned him here so that we may 
have a proper divorce. That is all. 
Defendant: Yes, it is true that I did chase the plaintiff from her 
house, but I did so because she does not understand me, and has 
misbehaved. I was very drunk when I insulted the plaintiff and her 
sister. This was wrong. Now I have even agreed to pay two cows for 
those insults. The plaintiff's guardian has even agreed to this 
compensation. I do not wish to divorce the plaintiff, since our four 
children would suffer without their mother. I only want my wife to 
be returned to me. That is all. 
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Plaintiff's Guardian: This matter has already been settled by the Chief 
Mungaila, who said that it was for us to decide. The defendant then came 
to me saying that he no longer wanted to be divorced from my daughter. He 
said that he would pay two cows as compensation for the insults which he 
made when he was drunk. Now my daughter says that she cannot agree to 
this even if he agrees to pay four cows. What soap can she use to stop 
her vagina from smelling? My daughter can no longer stay with the 
defendant, so I agree that they must be divorced. That is all. 
Judgement: There will be no divorce here. This trouble started when the 
defendant was drunk. The defendant admits that he was wrong to have 
insulted his wife and her sister, but has agreed to pay as many as four 
cows to compensate for these insults. This matter should be settled by 
paying compensation, not divorce. If there is divorce, the four children 
will suffer without their mother. These children should not be made to 
suffer because of something the defendant said when he was drunk. 
Now you, plaintiff, must remember your children. If you are using these 
insults as an excuse to marry a boyfriend, we will see this. You must 
remember your children, or surely they will not remember you. 
You, plaintiff's guardian, must return your daughter to her children. The 
defendant has agreed to pay you four cows for the insults to your 
daughter. This is correct. 
If anyone is not satisfied with this judgement, you have thirty days to 
appeal to the magistrate up to the high court. Out of the boxes. 
In reviewing the court's settlement in this instance, the court justices 
asserted that their decision not to permit divorce was based upon their 
evaluation of the facts of the dispute, according to a number of important 
factors. I was particularly interested in eliciting these "key" factors, 
since I was aware that in the historical record, divorce procedure was far 
from routinized. The key factors elicited from the court's justice, in order 
of importance, were: whether or not the wife was an inherited widow; whether 
or not the wife's parent or guardian consented to the divorce; whether or not 
the husband agreed to the divorce; whether or not the husband or wife was at 
fault; the number of children; the length of the marriage; the age of the 
wife; and, the amount of chiko paid. In view of these factors, the court 
justices asserted that the dispute above should not end in divorce. Despite 
the facts that the wife's guardian agreed to the divorce and the husband 
admitted fault for the grievances occasioning divorce, the grievance was not 
"very strong," there were four children to be considered, the marriage had 
lasted seventeen years without any major disputes, and, the husband agreed to 
pay four cows as compensation for the insults. "When husbands and wives have 
a small case," the justices argued, "the husband pays a cow or two to the 
wife's father, and the matter is reconciled." In their opinion, the grievance 
was quite simply, not a matter grave enough to warrant divorce. Though I 
could accept the logic of this argumentation, I had already uncovered case 
transcripts which indicated that divorces were sometimes granted for lesser 
provocations than a drunken insult. Moreover, through my case survey covering 
31 
the period 1966 to 1976, I had uncovered other seeming inconsistencies. When 
these transcripts ware presented to the court clerk for clari ficatior,, he 
perused my data sheets and laughingly responded, "If you can find out what 
they are doing, please tell me." From that point, I took considerable care in 
recording the facts and background of each divorce dispute aired at the local 
court, comparing the settlements according to the "key factors" noted by the 
remedy agents themselves. The results of this "key factor" survey for each of 
the twenty-three divorce disputes contained in my case population appear in 
the composite chart on the following page. 
In this chart, parental consent and husband's consent are constant and 
virtually constant, respectively. That is, for a woman to ask for divorce in 
the first place, she will need the assent of her guardian, who is responsible 
for returning the cattle if a divorce is granted. If he does not agree to 
return the chiko, then there can be no divorce. Parents and guardians, 
therefore, often refuse to grant immediate consent, thus invoking a "cooling 
off" period. If the husband wishes to reconcile the marriage or if the wife 
wishes to return to her husband, both have the opportunity to do so. When it 
appears that reconciliation is unlikely (2-24 months), the parent or guardian 
will then support his daughter in a divorce dispute at the local court. 
Husbands, on the other hand, note that "men do not divorce women, women 
divorce men." Though a husband may have knowingly provoked his wife into 
"exiting" the household, he will continue to profess that he does not desire 
divorce. Here, the rationale seems to be that by placing the desire for 
divorce upon the wife, the husband's fault in the dispute might be abrogated, 
and a favorable property settlement obtained in the divorce. That is, the 
burden of proof is on the wife, and if the husband's actions are found to be 
less than blameworthy, it will appear that the wife is using a minor grievance 
to escape from her marriage. This is clearly observable in the dispute 
related above. In this dispute, all of the husband's actions indicated that 
prior to appearing in the local court, he was willing to terminate the marital 
alliance. He had collected his wife's household goods, ordered her to stop 
cooking for him, and even went to the wife's kinsmen to collect his chiko 
cattle. This, I might add, was all done while he was not intoxicated. When 
he reached the local court, however, he argued that he did not want to be 
divorced, and that it was his wife who was seeking to divorce him so that she 
could marry one of her boy-friends. Even if the court would have permitted 
divorce in this case, the husband's remorse at his fault in the dispute might 
have tempered the court's decision regarding the amount of the property 
settlement (that is, the amount of chiko to be returned). As it turned out, 
the wife was found to be at fault for refusing to reconcile a seemingly 
"trivial" grievance, and such fault could be "saved up" and raised again in 
any subsequent matrimonial or divorce dispute between the couple. On the 
balance sheet of dispute, then, the husband had scored a credit by arguing 
that he did not actually want to be divorced from his wife. That others 
should argue their unwillingness to divorce their wives in almost every 
divorce dispute in the case population, save three which involved a widow and 
her husband's successor, is neither surprising nor particularly relevant as a 
variable in the court's decision-making. It is, however, a consideration in 
the court's assessment of fault. 
Other than the ''widow factor," which was completely predicative of the 
court's decision to allow or disallow divorce, the second strongest predictor 
of outcome was the factor of fault. While one might assume that where a 
husband was found at fault, there would be divorce, the dispute above refutes 
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Outcome 11> V 
Divorce yes yes yes none 6 18 51 7 
Divorce no yes no H 2 6 27 9 
Divorce no yes no H 0 11 45 4 
Divorce yes yes no H 0 2 55 3 
Divorce yes yes no H 5 1 31 11 
Divorce no yes no H 0 3 25 2 
Divorce yes yes no H 0 2 40 5 
Divorce no yes no w 8 22 37 12 
Divorce no yes no H 1 10 28 3 
. 
Divorce no yes no w 1 2 30 2 
Divorce no yes no w 2 7 30 8 
Divorce yes yes yes none 6 22 55 8 
Divorce no yes no H 1 1 22 2 
Divorce no yes no w 2 6 38 3 
Divorce yes yes yes none 1 5 30 8 
Divorce no yes no w 1 5 27 8 
Reconciliation no yes no H 4 17 40 11 
Reconciliation no yes no w 4 14 36 10 
Reconciliation no yes no H 4 15 40 8 
Reconciliation no yes no w 2 9 30 9 
Reconciliation no yes no H 2 4 24 0 
Reconciliation nc yes no w 1 2 20 0 
Reconciliation nc yes. no w t 3 26 2 
.. 
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such a notion. In fact, of the eleven disputes, where the husband was found 
at fault, there were three instances where divorce was granted. Similarly, 
one might expect that where a wife was found at fault, divorce would not be 
granted. However, in the nine divorce disputes where a woman was found at 
fault, divorce was allowed in four instances. 
When the number of children is considered as a factor in the court's 
decision-making regarding divorce, the picture_ becomes increasingly fuzzy. 
The argument above, "that the children will suffer if there is divorce" leads 
the observer to predict that where there are a few children involved, particu-
larly young children, there will be no divorce granted. The reverse hypo-
thesis would be that where there are no children at all, divorce would be more 
readily granted. There is little support for the first assertion, while the 
data do seem to confirm the latter. Having no children, therefore, does seem 
to increase the likelihood of matrimonial grievances, as well as the likeli-
hood that divorce will result from such grievances. 
As an independent factor in the court's decision-making regarding divorce, 
the length of the marriage is, at most, an ambiguous indicator of the court's 
ultimate decision. There are ample instances of long-standing alliances being 
terminated, as well as relatively short-term alliances being terminated. When 
the length of the marriage is considered along with the wife's age, less 
ambiguity obtains. Still, these conjoint factors are only weak indicators of 
the court's decision regarding divorce or reconciliation, and knowing these 
two factors does not raise the level of predictability any higher than a 
chance guess at the outcome. The final factor, the amount of the marriage 
payment, is the least indicative of the court's decision, and is probably only 
a significant variable when the consideration of a property settlement is 
introduced for those marriages being terminated. This factor will be given 
greater consideration in the discussion of settlement variability which 
follows the final extended case. 
While it is difficult to argue that these "key factors," when considered 
alone or in pairs, are largely insignificant in the court's decisions regard-
ing divorce, it is equally difficult to argue that all considered together, 
would yield any higher level of prediction. The possibility that such 
predictability of variance in the court's decisions could be obtained through 
a multiple regression analysis is quite attractive. Still, the size of the 
case population does not warrant invoking this rather sophisticated statis-
tical tool. I do, however, advocate that other researchers in this field 
should make a concerted effort to amass the number of cases necessary to apply 
the multiple regression technique, for the method has shown great promise in 
developing policy-capturing models of the activities of decision-makers (see 
Christal, 1968: 35-41; and Goldberg, 1970; 422-432). In spite of this 
shortcoming in my own data, I argue nevertheless that the predictability of 
outcome using the elicited "key factors" would be low, with the sole exception 
of the "widow factor." 
Since the chi-square correlations among the dependent and independent 
variables (with the exception of the "widow" factor) do not significantly 
predict the outcomes of divorce disputes in such a way that one could argue 
that divorce policy is being administered uniformly within the "key factors" 
cited,10 I am led to the inexorable conclusion that other implicit factors 
are being utilized for decision-making in the non-traditional disputing 
forum. From the argument which I have developed up to this point, this should 
not appear as too surprising. Yet, to assert from any statistical analysis 
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that there are implicit factors involved in the disputing process does not 
explicate what those factors are. I am forced, therefore, to return from a 
consideration of the general tendencies of "key factor" analysis in dispute 
processing, to the realm of the concrete disputing encounter cited above, and 
the social context in which it actually took place. 
In an extended time framework, both the husband and the plaintiff's father 
in the divorce dispute above had, within a period of two weeks, been litigants 
in two separate inheritance dispute aired in the local court. The husband had 
been successful in his claim for a sizeable portion of an estate. The 
defendant in that case had vigorously complained following the court's 
settlement that the plaintiff and the presiding court justice had colluded to 
deprive the defendant of his inheritance. Such claims are prevalent in 
disputing at the non-traditional level, and though "sour grapes" may play a 
part in the widespread incidence of accusations of collusive dispute settle-
ments, litigants clearly recall that one court justice was removed from the 
court for accepting bribes. Of course, one case does not prove a rule, but it 
certainly does lead to suspicions whenever a controversial settlement obtains 
in the local court. 
In the other recent inheritance case, the plaintiff's guardian had 
appeared as the defendant. Briefly, what happenend in this case was that when 
he was called upon to answer the plaintiff's allegation regarding the estate, 
the guardian argued that the dispute had already been resolved by the recently 
deceased Chief Mungaila. "Why," the guardian argued, "does the plaintiff wait 
until the Chief Mungaila is dead, to again bring up this matter?" Then as an 
aside, he noted, "You, Court President are a party to the theft of my 
cattle." When asked to repeat the aside, he refused to answer the court 
justice. Then, when it was the guardian's turn to give his statement to the 
court, he refused to cooperate. In the exchange which followed, the presiding justice was insulted, and the guardian was subdued and handcuffed by the court 
messenger. Following a night confined in the courthouse, the guardian was 
ordered to pay K40 (approximately $52) as a fine for contempt of court. The 
inheritance dispute was postponed to allow the guardian enough time to gather 
his witnesses. It was, however, during the ensuing interim that the guardian 
appeared as the daughter's witness in the divorce dispute related above. 
That the previous "contempt" encounter was still simmering was most 
evident in the guardian's demeanor during his daughter's divorce case. The 
guardian's initial comment to the court that the matter had already been 
resolved (by the alternative non-traditional remedy agent, the Chief 
Muangaila) was presented as an immediate challenge to the court's authority to 
intervene in the dipsute. Furthermore, the guardian's facetious inquiry 
regarding the soap which his daughter could use to stop her vagina from 
smelling, could only be taken as an attempt to cast the proceedings in 
humorous, if not farcical, light. The remark did, in fact, have an immediate 
impact upon the gallery, and the guardian's statement was interrupted by 
several minutes of prolonged laughter. The presiding justice, however, was 
not amused, and was only able to terminate the laughter by threatening a 
contempt charge against anyone who continued to laugh in the courtroom. That 
his daughter's case might suffer from his insolent demeanor seemed largely 
irrelevant to the guardian's attempt to even the score with the presiding 
justice for the previous indignity which had been "saved up" for just such an 
occasion. After all, the guardian would, in fact, benefit from the 
settlement, in the form of the four cows necessary to effect the matrimonial 
reconciliation. 
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In view of this extended case, I argue that a number of implicit "key 
factors" were involved in the court's decision not to allow divorce. Here, I 
would point to the justice's previous decision regarding the defendant's 
inheritance claim, which effected, if nothing more, a moral alignment. In 
addition, I would point to the "saved up" antagonism between the court and the 
plaintiff's guardian .11 Finally, I posit a curvilinear relationship between 
a litigant's demeanor in terms of submissiveness, passiveness, and respect, 
(or insolence, arrogance, and condescension) and the favorability/unfavor-
ability of settlements, as an implicit "key factor" in the court's decision-
making. This relationship would, of course, require additional testing to 
validate its relevance in decision-making fields. Unfortunately, my recording 
of disputes did not include this type of information, except where the 
litigant's demeanor actually disrupted the proceedings, or occasioned a 
warning from the justices. 
The last issue that I will address in this article is variability in 
divorce settlements, for indeed, success in "winning" divorce does not 
necessarily mean winning a favorable divorce settlement. The case below 
speaks to this issue in divorce disputing. 
Local Court Case 3 - "The Twelve-Month Pregnancy" (L.C., 344/10-10-78) 
( Charge is read by the court clerk, plea is submitted, witness is 
asked to leave the court, plaintiff speaks first). 
Plaintiff: I married the defendant in December, 1975. He paid two 
cattle for "first bride" (i.e., mulymusho and malaynshima). I stayed 
with the defendant until August 20, 1976, when he had adultery with 
Johnathan's wife. Then that woman came to my house and said that I 
was a fool for telling everyone such nonsense. I did nothing on that 
day, but the next time I saw her, I warned her to stay away from my 
husband. She said that there was nothing to stay away from, but she 
kept on doing sex with my husband. She came to my house four times 
looking for him. I told her that this was a bad thing, but they 
continued to meet in public. When I finally asked the defendant 
about this he said that I should not complain. He said that if I was 
unhappy with him, I should go somewhere that I would be happy. So I 
went to stay with my relatives. That was sometime in August, and 
since that time the defendant does not visit me or support me in any 
way. He doesn't support his child, and even fails to greet me when 
we meet. There is no sense to remain married to the defendant. For 
these reasons, I want to be divorced. That is all. 
(The Defendant now cross-eximines the Plaintiff). 
Defendant: 
Plaintiff: 
Defendant: 
Plaintiff: 
Defendant: 
Plaintiff: 
Defendant: 
Plaintiff: 
How long were we staying together? 
It was about eight months. 
Did I ever try to reconcile with you? 
Never. 
When did you become pregnant with the child? 
I was pregnant when I left you. 
When did you give birth? 
It was in July, 1977. 
Defendant: That's almost one year. Don't you know that a baby only 
takes nine months? 
Plaintiff: It always takes me twelve months to give birth. 
Defendant: 
Plaintiff: 
Defendant: 
Did you ever see me with Johnathan's wife? 
Others told me that you were seeing her publicly. 
tell me that she came to our house? 
Plaintiff: 
Why did you never 
I was angry when 
make any trouble. 
angry. 
she insulted me, but I didn't want to 
If I told you this, you would've been 
(The court justices now cross-examine the plaintiff). 
Court: 
Plaintiff: 
Court: 
Plaintiff: 
Why do you want to be divorced from the defendant? 
It is because of the adultery with Johnathan's wife. 
did this publicly and even made her pregnant. 
Has the defendant ever tried to reconcile with you? 
He never came to where I was staying. 
He 
Court: 
Plaintiff: 
Has the defendant ever supported you while you were away? 
Not even one ngwee. 
Court: Now, what about this child here? Is the defendant the 
father? 
Plaintiff: He is, but he denies this. 
Court: Who does the defendant accuse of making you pregnant? 
Plaintiff: No one. 
Court: Did the defendant know that you were pregnant when you 
left him? 
Plaintiff: Yes. I told him twice. 
Court: If you were pregnant in August, and it takes nine months 
for a baby to be born, when should you have given birth? 
Plaintiff: Nine months would make it May, 1977. But, I tell you 
truly, my pregnancies take twelve months. 
Court: That must cause you a great deal of pain. Yes? 
Plaintiff: No. It's not too bad even after so long. 
Court: Have you told a doctor about this? 
Plaintiff: Yes, but they can say nothing about this. 
Court: Did you ever tell your husband about your twelve month 
pregnancies? 
Plaintiff: I never told him about it since we were married for such 
a short time. 
Court: 
Plaintiff: 
How many boyfriends do you have? 
There is no one. 
(The defendant now speaks). 
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Defendant: I married the plaintiff on January 5, 1976. At that time 
I gave only two cattle to her father for the chiko. I stayed with 
her until August when all this trouble began. One day the plaintiff 
came to me in the store with her friend Violet. She found me talking 
to Johnathan's wife, and immediately began to beat her with the help 
of Violet. Now Johnathan's wife had only come to buy some tobacco, 
so I had to stop them from fighting. Then the plaintiff said that 
she was going for chisungu at Shibanze' s village. But, instead of 
doing that, she packed her goods and left the house. We never 
argued, so I wrote her father who said that she would return to me. 
Then after two months of waiting, I heard that she was in town. One 
day White told me that she was back, so I sent my worker to go 
collect her. But, when he returned, he told me that the plaintiff 
was still in town. This woman was moving around too much for me to 
follow her. Finally in January 1977, I went to the plaintiff's 
father to tell him about all of this. He told me that my wife was at 
Nyambo, but that she would be returning the next day. I waited 
there, but she never returned. Now at that time I wanted to find out 
about her pregnancy. When she left my house in August she was not 
pregnant. Then when I saw her in December she was. I told her to go 
to the clinic, and they told her that the pregnancy was three months 
old. I asked her who the father of this child could be, and she said 
that I was. But, if the pregnancy was three months old, I could not 
be the father, so I denied this. Now I do not want to divorce this 
woman until I know who is responsible for the child, so that I can 
claim compensation for the adultery, that is all. 
(The plaintiff now cross-examines the defendant). 
Plaintiff: How many times did you seek my return? 
Defendant: I followed you three times. 
Plaintiff: How do you know what the doctor told me at the clinic? 
Defendant: I wasn't there but I spoke to the medical assistant, and 
he showed me your chart. 
Plaintiff: Why do you say that I never told you I was pregnant in 
August? 
Defendant: You didn't. 
Plaintiff: If you are not the child's father, then who is? 
Defendant: You must know better than I. 
Plaintiff: Didn't you sleep with me in Jnauary? 
Defendant: Yes. 
Plaintiff: If it was not your pregnancy, why did you do this? 
Defendant: You are my wife, and I did not believe that it would harm 
the womb. 
(The Court Justices now cross-examine the defendant). 
Court: 
Defendant: 
Court: 
Defendant: 
Do you still deny that the child is yours? 
Yes. 
Look here at the child. Doesn't it resemble you at all? 
No. See how the face is different from mine. 
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(Plaintiff's guardian is now called to make his statement). 
Witness: I am the plaintiff's guardian. When our father died, I 
was chosen to eat the name. When the defendant married my sister, he 
paid two cattle. Then my sister came to me saying that the defendant 
did not love her at all. He was openly taking Johnathan's wife, and 
neglecting the plaintiff. The defendant came to settle this matter, 
but my sister does not wish to return to him. I cannot force her to 
be married to such a bad husband. They should be divorced. That is 
all. 
(The defendant now cross-examines the witness). 
Defendant: 
Witness: 
Defendant: 
Witness: 
Defendant: 
Witness: 
Was your sister pregnant when she came to your village? 
Yes. 
Does the child look like me at all? 
Yes. It does look very much like you. 
Does your sister have any boyfriends? 
I'm her brother. I can't know that. 
(The court justices now cross-examine the witness). 
Court: 
Witness: 
Court: 
Witness: 
Court: 
Witness: 
If it takes nine months for a baby to be born, and this 
child was born in July, when would this pregnancy have 
begun? 
Nine months ••• that would be September or early October. 
Now, when did your sister come to stay with you? 
August or September. 
Your sister has no boyfriends? 
I can't know that! 
(The court justices retire to their chambers to consider their 
settlement). 
Judgement: You two, plaintiff and defendant, are now divorced. You, 
plaintiff, are too jealous. We found that Johnathan had no good case 
for accusing the defendant for committing adultery. You have no 
witnesses or evidence either. But, it is you who has adulteries~ 
You claim that you were pregnant in August, but you did not give 
birth until July. Ha! We here at the court are not fools. If you 
were three months pregnant in December, then the pregnancy began in 
October. You are having boyfriends, and only wish to hide this from 
the defendant so the he can't claim compensation from your lover. 
This is a bad thing. 
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You, defendant, say that you will only agree to divorce if you are 
paid compensation for the adultery. Well, that shall be. 
You plaintiff's guardian, must return the two cattle which the 
defendant paid you as "first bride." The child will stay with the mother 
until it stops sucking, and then it will stay with the defendant. 
If you are not satisfied with the judgement, you have thirty days to 
appeal to the magistrate up to the high court. Out of the boxes. 
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In this dispute, the court's decision to allow divorce affirms the 
decision of the familial authority, the plaintiff's brother. However, while 
the decisions reached by both the familial "expert witness" and the local 
court are the same (i.e., divorce), the assignation of fault is the exact 
opposite. For the plaintiff and her brother, the fact that the defendant was 
observed on several occasions talking with another man's wife, indicated that 
there was an adulterous relationship being conducted publicly. While neither 
the plaintiff nor her brother asserted that it was improper for the defendant 
to be conducting an extra-marital affair, they argued that it was insulting 
for the defendant to be taking another man's wife so openly. The plaintiff, 
quite simply, was being made to look like a fool. In this light, her grie-
vance with the defendant seemed highly credible. The court, however, argued 
that the defendant had been earlier exonerated of his part in the alleged 
adultery. Since the plaintiff had no new evidence which could substantiate 
the defendant's impropriety, there could be no real basis for her grievance. 
On the contrary, it appeared that the plaintiff, herself, was the one who 
was having an adulterous relationship, having even become pregnant while away 
from her marital household. While the defendant was unable to introduce any 
evidence about this adulterous affair, the proof was in the pudding. Reckon-
ing the month of conception, by subtracting nine months from the month of 
birth, the court was able to approximate that the adultery had taken place 
sometime in October. An additional time referent was provided second-hand by 
the husband who argued that the medical assistant had told him in December 
that the wife's pregnancy was three months old. The final evidence of the 
plaintiff's adulterous conception, was found through the invocation of the 
often employed look-alike "test." Since the baby girl of four months shared 
no discernable traits with the defendant, the adultery was "proven," and it 
was now the defendant who had a proper grievance. Using the "key factor" 
analysis at this point, it would appear that if the husband did not really 
wish to be divorced from his wife, then the marriage would have been recon-
ciled. The defendant's statement to the court, however, indicated that his 
only reason for remaining married would be to discover the name of his wife's 
adulterer, and then claim compensation from him. This might have happened if 
the marriage was reconciled, and then again it might not have happened, ever. 
The matter, however, was rendered moot by the court's decision. 
The property settlement indicated that the plaintiff's brother would have 
to return the initial marriage payment - the two cows designated as "first 
bride." Second, the custody of the infant was to be rescinded to the husband 
after weaning. While affirming the matrimonial norm regarding a husband's 
paternal rights to all children born by his wife, regardless of actual 
biological parentage, other rules regarding the refundability of initial 
marriage payments ( "first bride"), and the responsibility of the wife's 
kinsmen regarding her adulteries, seemed, in this instance, to be "bent" to 
fit the particular context of this divorce dispute. Once again, my conclu-
sions in this regard were shaped, not by my own assumptions about the nature 
of divorce settlements, but by those of the decision-makers, themselves. 
Quite early in my fieldwork, I had asked the court justices to instruct me 
in their method of calculating the property settlements where divorce had been 
granted. Their formula took into account four "key factors": whether or not 
the woman was a widow, who was at fault in the dispute, the amount of the 
marriage payment, and the number of children which the woman had born in the 
marriage. Roughly, the number of children was to be subtracted from the 
amount of marriage payment, whereupon the resulting remainder would then be 
i 
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adjusted according to the "widow factor," and the "fault factor." That is, 
there was an expressed idea that a widow should be provided with a "pension" 
from the marriage payment, where her "service" to the husband's group had been 
more than a decade, and she was not at fault in the divorce dispute. Simi-
larly, where the wife was not a widow, a husband's fault would result in 
lowered property settlement. To assess the actual application of this formula 
in property settlements following divorce, I have presented the charts below. 
To clarify the application of the elicited formula, I have considered widows 
and non-widows separately. 
CHART 11 - ELICITED KEY FACTORS IN DIVORCE SETTLEMENTS FOR WIDOWS 
Cases Fault Cattle Paid Children Property Expected Deviation 
Chiko F1 rst Bride 1:ngagement Settlement 
l. none 7 0 0 6 0 l -1 
2. none 8 0 0 6 0 2 -2 
3. none 8 0 0 1 4 7 -3 
4. H 3 0 0 0 2 3 -1 
5. H 9 2 2 5 5 4 +l 
6. ·. H 5 0 0 0 3 5 -2 
CHART 12 ELICITED KEY FACTORS IN DIVORCE SETTLEMENTS FOR NON-WIDOWS 
-
Cases Fault Cattle Paid . Children Property Expected Deviation 
Chiko First Bride Engagement Settlement 
1. H 6 2 1 2 4 4 0 
2. H 4 0 0 0 1 4 -3 
3. H 2 0 0 0 2 2 0 
4. H 3 0 0 1 0 2 -2 
5. H 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 
6. w 8 2 2 8 0 0 0 
7. w 0 2 0 1 2 0 +2 
8. w 8 0 0 2 7 6 +l 
9. w 3 0 0 2 1 1 0 
10. w 8 0 0 1 8 7 +l 
' I 
' i 
' 
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The two charts above indicate the range of variabliltiy in the court's 
divorce settlements, by specifically contrasting the actual settlement with an 
expected settlement, which excludes the fault factor of non-widows, and the 
fault and pension factors for widows. The variation in divorce settlements 
ranges from three fewer cattle to be refunded than expected, to two more 
cattle to be refunded than expected. By next comparing the fault factor with 
the deviations from expected settlements, assigned for each dispute involving 
a non-widow, it is possible to evaluate the relative importance of fault in 
the court's decision-making regarding the actual settlement. In five instan-
ces where a husband was found to be at fault, there were only two which 
yielded negative deviations (i.e., -2, and -3). That is, the husband's fault 
in the divorce resulted in a property settlement lower than that which would 
have obtained barring any consideration of fault. Not only did these husbands 
lose their wives, but they were also "punished" for their fault in the 
resulting property settlement. In the remaining three instances where a 
husband was found to be at fault, the court's settlements matched the expected 
settlement, yielding a zero deviation. That is, the husband's, fault in the 
divorce dispute was given no weight in the court's decision regarding the 
return of the marriage payment. These husbands, therefore, were not penalized 
for their fault, even though the opportunity for such penalty was clearly 
available within the decision-making field. 
In five instances where a wife was found to be at fault, there were three 
which yielded a positive deviation (i.e., +l, +l, +2). That is, the wife's 
fault in the divorce dispute resulted in a property refund greater than that 
which might have been expected barring the fault factor. For example, in the 
dispute related above, which resulted in the positive deviation of +2, the 
expected refund of cattle was zero, for indeed, the husband had never trans-
ferred anything refundable to the wife's kinsmen. However, "justice" could 
not be served with a zero refund, and the wife and her guardian were "pun-
ished" by having to refund "first bride" as compensation for the wife's 
adultery. In the remaining two instances where a wife was found to be at 
fault in the divorce dispute, this factor was given no weight in the court's 
property settlement. These wives and their kinsmen were not, therefore, 
penalized for their fault even though the the opportunity for such penalty 
was, once again, available within the decision-making field. In summary, 
property settlements dealing with the refund of the marriage payment vary from 
no deviation to positive deviation where wives are found at fault. There are 
no instances of the opposite, where husbands or wives at fault are actuallly 
rewarded for their fault in the divorce. Still, the decision not to penalize 
a husband or wife found to be at fault in the dispute, can be a reward in 
itself. This is even clearer considering the deviation range observed in 
penalties imposed upon errant husbands and wives. It is this range of 
deviation which allows the court room for maneuver in its decisions regarding 
the refund of the marriage payment. Who is penalized or not penalized, and 
why, are thus more important questions to be addressed than the simple 
assignment of fault. 
In property settlements where a widow is involved, the maneuverability of 
assigning fault is somewhat limited. That is, a widow cannot be found at 
fault, since the provision for the inheritance of widows is no longer enforce-
able in non-traditional forums. A widow has the implied right to refuse to be 
inherited by her husband's successor, and many of these successors will not 
even contest the widow's claim to be divorced. When they do, the successors 
are invariably found at fault, regardless of the facts surrounding the 
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dispute. As a consequence, negative refund deviations are found to obtain in 
each property settlement of this type sampled, except one. This anomaly 
appeared in one case where the constitution of the marriage payment was 
difficult to substantiate, because of the length of the marriage. The widow 
and her guardian claimed that the marriage payment consisted of nine cattle 
for chiko, and two cattle for "first bride." The successor, however, claimed 
that all eleven cattle were for chiko, and that none were for first bride. 
According to the wife's claim, the expected settlement, barring fault and 
pension factors, should have been four cattle. According to the successor's 
claim, the expected settlement, barring fault and pension factors, should have 
been six cattle. The court's settlement of five cattle to be refunded thus 
yielded the expected negative refund deviation. That is, the successor 
received one cow less than he might have expected, using his calculation of 
eleven cattle as chiko. 
Using this negative deviation index where a widow was involved, the number 
of cattle to be refunded varied from -1 to -3. Stated simply, a husband in a 
divorce dispute with a widow invariably stands to lose something. Positive 
deviations do not exist because of the widow factor in determining fault, and 
zero deviations do not exist because of the residual pension factor. In the 
case of the latter factor, however, there is the potential for maneuver. 
Accepting that negative deviations are inevitable, the amount of the widow's 
pension becomes the central stone upon which many axes can be ground. One 
might argue that service to the deceased's family, judged by length of 
marriage and number of children born, are crucial to the pension decision, and 
well they are. However, in view of the fact that where the highest negative 
deviations obtained, there were no children in one union and only one in 
another, I am forced to continue my argument that other factors are at play in 
the disputing arena. 
Returning briefly to the divorce dispute related above, the manipulation 
of fault assessment by the court, so that the accusor became the accused, as 
well as the bending of matrimonial norms regarding the refundability of "first 
bride" and parental responsibility for a daughter's adulteries, involved a 
cost accounting process which extended far beyond the actual litigational 
context. What external factors might have contributed to the court's proce-
dural and substantive manipulations? Objectively, there were many. The close 
friendship between the defendant and one of the court justices cast these 
proceedings, and those of the former adultery dispute, in a suspicious light. 
Conspicuous exchanges of lemons and sweet potatoes did little to dampen such 
suspicions. But, more importantly, the defendant was a local storekeeper, who 
as a source for exceptionally scarce commodities like sugar, cooking oil, and 
soap, was not beyond using his control over such resources to curry favor with 
the court. Even if the currying of favor was not explicit, it was implicitly 
clear that scarce commodities were mostly available only on an under the 
counter. For those who had something more than money to offer, these 
commodities were readily available. For those with only money, these 
commodities were often "out of stock." Could the court risk long-term 
estrangement from locally-based "goodies?" The answer to this query lies 
primarily with the identities of the plaintiff and her guardian. Who were 
they, and what possible motivation could the court have to alienate them 
judicially? Quite simply, they were already alienated. The plaintiff's 
guardian resided in another chieftancy, and as such, posed no particular 
threat for disturbing the local flow of events. If he objected to the court's 
manipulatons, there was really little he could do about it. There was 
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recourse to appeal, but in many instances of such appeals, the magistrate 
ruled for the precedence of "local customs." There was the rub. Regardless 
of how they chose to argue, the plaintiff and her brother could always be made 
to look like ignorant outsiders. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Where remedy agents and litigants themselves recognize the disputing 
process as inherently political, the question must be posed: "Should anthropo-
logists do any less?" (Moore, 1978:207). The response which I suggest is a 
qualified "no." I would not argue that there are no instances where legal 
processes operate apart from political processes; there are. I would argue, 
however, that such independence of action will largely be determined by the 
social context in which both processes are embedded. That is, the indepen-
dence of rule-making and rule-enforcing is more a function of the way rule 
makers and rule enforcers perceive their roles than any natural division in 
the decision-making process. Where leaders have traditionally fulfilled roles 
as remedy agents, and remedy agents fulfilled roles as leaders, I would argue 
that law will be politically active, and political action legally binding. 
Where remedy agents and leaders have traditionally fulfilled separate and 
discrete roles, I would argue that law will be legally active, and political 
action politically binding. But the fact is that neither of these alterna-
tives exist except within the framework of an ideal typology. We may argue 
that the political/legal system in the United States approaches the latter 
ideal type, while that of the Ila approaches the former ideal type. Such 
ideal typing may be minimally instructive, but we must be clearly aware that, 
regardless of concepts such as separation of powers or non-separation of 
powers, U.S. judges do make policy and Ila justices do enforce policy, other 
than their own. 
Rather than relying upon an idealized model of judicial decision-making, 
in either case, I suggest that it is more profitable to view both rule-making 
and rule-enforcing as an ongoing social process, with a history peculiar unto 
itself, and an adaptability which allows that history to be reinvented 
periodically. The reinvention of society's legal history involves individual 
choice-making in which rules are manipulated, circumvented, reinforced, 
remade, or buried for future reference. The investigator of any legal system 
who attempts to utilize a "law as social process" theory, however, immediately 
faces the burgeoning problem of a rather inadequate research paradigm. That 
is, structural or institutional oriented methodologies are incapable of 
handling individual choice-making over time, since by definition, choices are 
constrained within structural boundaries or autonomous institutions. More 
recent strategy-oriented methodologies for investigating kinship, economic and 
political organization, and even ritual, have broken the ground for under-
standing interpersonal behavior in action settings. There is no reason to 
assume that studies in anthropology of law cannot do equally well. 
We have before us the proposition that the semi-autonomous field is a 
suitable way to define the instrumental components of legal process, within a 
more encompassing framework of legal change theory (see Moore, 1978:57). 
According to Moore , the semi-autonomous field in not defined by its boun-
daries, but by its rule-making and rule-enforcing characteristics; these 
fields are articulated within larger and smaller matrices which can, and do, 
affect and invade rule-making and rule enforcement (1978:55-59). This article 
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has set about to analyze legal change affecting Ila women in both an histor-
ical and contemporary litigational context, utilizing the research methodology 
suggested above. The reader will have to decide how well this has been 
accomplished, and whether the hypothesis stated at the outset of this paper 
could have been more fruitfully tested within an alternative paradigm. It is 
my own opinion, however, that the political dimension of disputing and 
dispute-processing, where female Ila litigants are involved, has been substan-
tially elucidated by this innovative methodology. 
In general, I conclude that within traditional and non-traditional 
decision-making fields, and the disputing forums constituted within them, 
there is always one segment of political alignment which attempts to assert 
its authority over other segments aligned within the field. The data from 
these action settings further indicate that there are frequently a number of 
decision-making fields simultaneously articulated within the settings, and 
that these fields actually compete for the power resources at stake. House-
holds are set against households, households against the kraal group, the 
kraal group against the chief, the chief against the local court, the local 
against the magistrate, and so forth. While the organization of this competi-
tion is somewhat hierarchical, there is an element of egalitarianism obser-
vable in the fact that Ila litigants do not perceive or even approach these 
decision-making fields sequentially. That is, where a grievance arises which 
occasions public decision-making, disputants utilize the forum and remedy 
agent which seems to offer the most predictable and sanctionable settlement 
with the least attendant expenditure of social or political resources. In 
this, the decision to make a grievance public, as well as the selection of the 
"best" forum, can serve to reinforce, redefine, undermine, or usurp the 
authority of remedy agents between and among competing fields. I have argued 
throughout this article therefore, that disputing and dispute processing, 
where female Ila litigants are involved, can be clearly understood only when 
adequate attention is given to variables internal as well as external to the 
actual dispute setting. The competition between and among various decision-
making fields is, as I have demonstrated, a strong implicit factor in all 
judicial decision-making. There is no sense in arguing that explicit vari-
ables internal to the dispute setting are being summoned to mend a social 
rift. Case after case has shown that that emphatically external, and funda-
mentally political variables -- the quest for control of scarce resources, and 
the legitimization of decision-making authority -- are at play in disputing 
forums. I conclude that for the Ila, disputing for power is an inherent 
dimension in the disputing process, and that this dimension can and does 
overshadow actual disputes and their settlements. There are many times, 
therefore, when the rift in society is intentionally widened rather than 
mended. 
For Ila women in general, and female Ila litigants in particular, this 
reality is made clear in every disputing forum sought to redress their 
grievances. Though the provision for broader access to judicial resources did 
indeed provide the basis for altering their former status in society, rapid 
advances were clearly impeded when the company administrators turned judicial 
authority over to the Native Authorities. Within the vague rules of matri-
monial and divorce disputing, there was ample room for political maneuver, and 
the challenges which a woman might make against either her husband or male 
kinsmen could easily be subsumed within broader political issues which 
involved Ila males. Despite the subordination of their aims to those of the 
males aligned in the decision-making field, Ila women have made, and continue 
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to make, some short-term advances in the realm of personal and property 
rights. That is, a woman can now seek and win compensation when she has been 
assaulted, and, as the data show, male kinsmen can no longer deprive their 
female counterparts of property by either deceit or "unfair" distribution. I 
argue, however, that even though the local court may enforce these rules in 
their judgements, the female litigants, who exhibit a preference for using the 
local court to pursue these grievances, must still rely upon their status 
within the traditional authority fields to sanction the court's settlements. 
Also, the fact that women can win compensation for being assaulted has not 
really deterred men from assaulting them. 
In conclusion, the historical and contemporary case records are clear in 
this: dispute settlements involving female litigants are matters of politi-
cized decision-making; and the political component does, in fact, affect the 
way in which Ila females choose to handle their grievances. The implicit and 
external political variable has been clearly demonstrated to be a crucial 
factor in dispute settlements and disputing in general, often providing the 
missing links in normative judicial reasoning. Until Ila women themselves 
achieve the moral and transactional basis necessary to establish some form of 
decision-making authority, they will continue to be manipulated much the same 
way as they were in the past ( for example, to contract alliances, or to 
undercut the perceived advantage of a political rival). Within the localized 
boundaries of the cattle-oriented economy, which continues to be monopolized 
by Ila men, this step will be difficult to achieve. Where justice is not 
blind, but quite clear-sighted in its intentions, it is the shrewd manipulator 
who succeeds in the long run. In this, Ila women are manipulated, not 
manipulating. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1 The field research upon which this paper is based was conducted in 
Zambia in 1977-1978 with the support and aid of the African Studies Center, 
Boston University, the Institute for African Studies, University of Zambia, 
and the Law Development Commission, Ministry of Legal Affairs, Republic of 
Zambia. The primary report of that research is Cutshall (1980). I wish to 
acknowledge the financial support of Boston University in the presentation of 
an earlier draft of this paper at the annual meeting of the Canadian Ethno-
logical Society (1980). I am grateful for the comments and instructive criti-
cisms on that version of this paper that were provided by Philip Gulliver, 
Richard Canter, and Daniel McCall. I would also like to acknowledge the 
financial support of the National Institute of Mental Health, Post-doctoral 
Fellowship in Criminal Justice, (T32 MH 151199-04) which has allowed me the 
opportunity to forumlate the present draft of this paper. Finally, I would 
like to thank my colleagues and support personnel at the School of Criminal 
Justice, S.U.N.Y. - Albany, for the part that they played in the preparation 
of this manuscript. 
2 While this topic is neither novel or unique (see Barnes, 1961, 1969; 
Gulliver, 1963; Beidelman, 1966, 1967; and Moore, 1978), Nader has recently 
argued that "there has been little systematic discussion of law and the dis-
tribution of power in either the sociological or the anthropological 
literature" (1978: 19-20). 
3 The Ila-speaking peoples of this area are no strangers in the ethno-
graphic literature of Central Africa, known primarily from the research re-
ports of Smith and Dale (1920), Tuden (1963, 1968, 1970), and Fielder (1969, 
1973). 
4 The "repugnancy clause" contained in the British South Africa Company 
Charter noted that local customs and procedures should be followed in civil 
cases involving natives, "so far as that law is applicable and is not 
repugnant to natural justice or morality" (Northern Rhodesia Order, 1924, art. 
36). 
5 Smith and Dale's "Ila-Speaking Peoples of Northern Rhodesia" (1920) is 
a broad historical source for this presentation. Their report has been sup-
plemented by primary sources (such as District Reports and Commission 
Inquiries) located in the Zambian National Archives. 
6 These disputing encounters were recorded by my field assistants, who 
resided in the vicinity of residential units sampled. Once a week these 
records were collected, and both litigants and remedy agents were inter-
viewed. Whenever possible, I was present at the disputing encounter to ensure 
the overall reliability of the assistant's recording of the dispute. 
7 Unlike their Lenje neighbors to the north (see Canter, 1978), the Ila 
never developed a system of village nkuta. 
8 I was present at the local court for each of these cases. My own 
recording of the case proceedings and that of my field assistant were then 
compared with the "official" case transcript recorded by the court clerk for 
purposes of cross-validation. Each litigant was subsequently interviewed 
outside the courtroom setting. In addition to this, I regularly met with the 
court justices to discuss the cases which I had observed and recorded. 
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9 Since my primary concern in this article is female roles in disputing, 
I have not included in these charts the types of disputes pursued by paired 
male litigants. This material is contained in Cutshall (1980). 
10 Chi square values for each of the "key factors" are: widow 
(xz=l3.4, p .01); parental consent (x2-0.0); husband's consent (x2=0.0); 
fault (x2=5.08, p .02); number of children (x2=1.68); length of marriage 
(x2=1.84); wife's age (x2=.48); and, amount of marriage payment (x2=1.6). 
11 The plaintiff's guardian seemed convinced from the outset that his 
daughter's chances for achieving any measure of sucess were quite doubtful. 
The court's refusal to allow divorce on two subsequent occasions seemed to 
verify this conclusion. The presiding justice would only state in response 
that "He is a troublesome old man." 
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